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With the progression of computer systems to local and wide
area networks, the scope of computer security has increased
dramatically over the past two decades. The ability to adequately
safeguard information while ensuring resource availability is
becoming increasingly challenging to system administrators. Given
enough time and resources, any system may be broken into and the
information accessed. To prevent this occurrence, a balance must
be achieved where the cost of breaking into the system outweighs
the benefits derived from the action. The National Security Agency
(NSA) developed the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) to provide those specifying a system with a set of
expectations regarding the assurance of policy enforcement and to
provide vendors with a set of standards against which systems could
be developed. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the TCSEC
and its applicability to a Department of Defense (DOD) system in a
networked environment using current technology.
B . OBJECTIVE
The intent of this thesis is to examine the TCSEC and its
application within the military using existing commercial products.
During the past decade, much discussion has taken place within the
DOD regarding the requirements for government computers to achieve
specific levels of trust. At the beginning of the 1990' s, "C2 by
92" was a phrase that was frequently used in computer meetings and
seminars throughout the DOD. However, the lack of available
products, an overall lack of understanding of the technology and
requirements, politics, and a lack of resources prevented that
slogan from becoming a reality. Over the past few years, numerous
vendors have been striving to furnish evaluated products which will
now enable the Class C2 level of trust to be achieved.
With the continuing rise in the number of networks installed
throughout the DOD and wider connectivity through the Internet, the
importance of establishing a "trusted" system is rapidly gaining
acceptance. A thorough analysis of the Class C2 certification
process using a major network operating system such as Windows NT,
is an excellent way to determine if the certification is
attainable. Windows NT server was selected for this evaluation due
to its increasing popularity among Navy commands.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to achieve the objective listed above, the following
research questions were addressed:
1. What are the requirements to achieve a Class C2 level of
trust in a computer network?
a. How are computer networks certified for a specific
level of trust?
b. What are the benefits of a "trusted" system?
c. What are the limitations of certification?




Can a network be connected to the Internet and
still provide a Class C2 level of trust?
2. What are the capabilities of Windows NT Server 3.51?
a. How does Windows NT support the Class C2 level of
trust?
b. What are the software's security limitations?
c. How easily does Windows NT interface with other
network systems?
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
With computers and the information they maintain increasingly
under attack, more people are beginning to take computer security
seriously. However, many still do not fully understand what
computer security is and why it is so important. This paper begins
by identifying some basics of computer security. The TCSEC
requirements are discussed in detail and an example application of
the criterion is presented. In conjunction with the example
application, an analysis of the Windows NT Server version 3.51
Network Operating System (NOS) is presented for both security and
interoperability issues. Finally, the need for computer security
standards for the government and the responsiveness of today's
market to meeting those needs are addressed.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary methods of research to support this study included
an in-depth literature search, use of the World Wide Web, and
correspondence with government and industry representatives. The
literature search included a review of numerous books, magazine
articles, and government publications. The World Wide Web was used
to obtain the latest information on the certification process and
to gain information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the
Windows NT software. Correspondence with officials at the National
Security Agency (NSA) , Microsoft, and other federal agencies were
used to obtain information on test results, computer security
problems, and future actions.
F. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows:
• Chapter II, "Computer Security," provides a general overview
of computer security. The goals of computer security are
discussed and security terms are defined. The chapter
concludes with a brief description of the evolution of
government computer security initiatives.
• Chapter III, "The Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria (TCSEC) , " identifies the fundamental security
requirements upon which the evaluation criterion are based.
The divisions of trust and terminology used with the
criterion are discussed in detail. The system certification
and accreditation process is described. In addition, the
product evaluation process is briefly described.
• Chapter IV, "The Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) ,
"
compares the criterion for a network evaluation to the
stand-alone TCSEC criterion. The differences in the
evaluation processes are briefly described.
• Chapter V, "The Falcon LAN - Applying the TCSEC/TNI
Criterion, " presents an overview of the network installed at
the Defense Language Institute and provides an in-depth
analysis of Windows NT 3.51 server. Both trust and
interoperability issues are discussed.
• Chapter VI, "Conclusion - The Pro's and Con's of Ensuring
Trust," discusses the benefits and pitfalls of applying the
TCSEC to military systems today. Issues such as the effect
on system life cycle costs, the time required for product
evaluation, and the market's responsiveness to providing
trusted products are presented. A summary of research
findings and recommendations for ensuring the DLI LAN is
included.
II. COMPUTER SECURITY
With today's expanded availability of computers, an increasing
number of people are finding themselves vulnerable to the perils of
the information age. As such, the topic of computer security is
becoming a "hot issue." Computer security isn't a new topic, but
one that has existed since the development of the first computer.
What is new, however, is the broader view that must be taken to
ensure the security of a system and the information it contains.
Government agencies are particularly vulnerable to computer
intrusions due to the nature of the business conducted and the high
profile target they represent. Since the late 1980' s, several
attacks or intrusions have become well publicized. For example,
the West German Computer Club (better known as the Chaos Club)
announced in 1987 that it had successfully penetrated NASA's
computer systems. NASA was unaware of this intrusion until
messages began appearing on their system. Also in 1987, a 75 cent
accounting error alerted Cliff Stoll, an astronomer turned systems
manager at Lawrence Berkeley Lab, to another intrusion. For two
years, Dr. Stoll followed the intruder as he tried to break into
over 450 computer systems (many of which were government owned)
.
[Ref . 1] Eventually the chase led to a small group of West German
hackers with ties to the Soviet KGB. Finally, the computer worm of
1988 was released on the Internet by Robert T. Morris, Jr., a
Cornell University graduate student, on November 2nd. In less than
48 hours, the worm spread throughout the network, infecting more
than 2,100 computers. Although no data was actually destroyed, the
cost of fixing the systems and lost work hours was estimated at
over $1 million. [Ref . 2] These are just a few examples of where
the absence of secure systems and computer security management
techniques have resulted in serious intrusions and why improved
approaches to computer security are required.
The government is not alone with respect to this need. With
the rapid increase in the number of computer systems, computer
crime has become a major threat to American business. "According
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) , computer crime is
currently the most expensive form of commercial crime - with an
average cost of $450,000 per theft. This represents a greater risk
to corporations than fire or any other type of hazard." [Ref. 3:
p. 7] In addition, the FBI estimates the total figure for computer
theft may range as high as $5 billion per year. Compounding the
problem is the lack of law enforcement attention given to these
crimes. Estimates indicate that up to 90% of all computer crimes
and intrusions are never reported outside of the organization. Of
those that are reported, only a fraction of the cases are ever
prosecuted. [Ref. 3: p. 8] In fact, reports concerning computer
crime date back to the 1940' s. However, it wasn't until 1966 that
the first federal prosecution for a computer crime took place. The
case involved the use of a computer to alter the records of a
Minneapolis bank. [Ref. 4: p. 16]
There are several reasons why computer security breaches are
not publicized. Government system intrusions are not publicized in
an attempt to limit the disclosure of security holes or
vulnerabilities. By publicizing such information, other computer
intruders may take advantage of the information gained to penetrate
additional government systems with the same or similar weaknesses.
In the commercial sector, computer intrusions are not
publicized for fear that customers would lose confidence in a
company and take their business elsewhere. Legal concerns also
keep many businesses from publicizing computer intrusions. If a
company maintains information on customers or employees that is
protected under the Privacy Act of 1987, the company may be held
liable for any unauthorized disclosure of the information. This
liability could further increase any financial losses caused by the
intrusion.
The use of "trusted" computer systems is one approach to
dealing with problems such as these. However, before discussing
the criterion used to achieve trust in a system, an overview of
computer security and its terminology is needed. The following
sections present this overview. Although not every aspect of
computer security is presented here, the reader should achieve a
good basic understanding of what computer security is and what
threats it is trying to avoid.
A. GOALS OF COMPUTER SECURITY
Computer security focuses on the achievement of three main
goals: secrecy (confidentiality), integrity, and availability.
Secrecy ensures information including unclassified, private,
sensitive, and classified data, is not disclosed to an unauthorized
person. Integrity, also referred to as accuracy, means the system
must not corrupt the information maintained on it or permit any
unauthorized changes to occur through either accidental or
malicious means. Availability ensures the system is operating
efficiently and is able to recover quickly and completely in the
event of a disaster or attempted disruption. Loss of power,
flooding, fire, and unwelcomed system penetration are all examples
of disasters for which a system must be prepared. If users are
unable to access the computer resources needed, then a denial of
service has occurred.
In addition to these goals, computer networks have introduced
two additional requirements: authentication and nonrepudiation.
Authentication requires the address of a message (such as
electronic mail) to be identified with a high level of certainty
that the address is correct. In a sense, it is an aspect of
integrity. Nonrepudiation implies that neither the sender nor
receiver of a message can deny its transmission.
Achievement of any or all of these goals is dependent upon the
environment in which the system is operating. In some cases, one
or two aspects of security may be more important than the others
.
To determine the services which are needed, the goals and
environment of each computer system must be assessed.
B. VULNERABILITIES AND THREATS
A security assessment typically identifies the vulnerabilities
and threats to a system. A vulnerability indicates a point where
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a system is susceptible to an attack. Examples of system
vulnerabilities include: physical threats, natural disasters,
mechanical breakdowns, electronic signals, external connections,
and people. If the computer system is a network, it is vulnerable
at any point where it contacts another network or system.
Vulnerable points include bridges, routers, and modems, as well as
floppy diskettes and portable computers.
A threat is an avenue through which a person or event may
exploit a vulnerability to adversely affect the system. Security
experts list toll fraud, theft, viruses, disgruntled employees,
accidents, and ignorance as the most likely threats faced by system
administrators today. [Ref . 4: p 9] In terms of numbers, errors
and accidents typically represent the largest threat to a network.
As Richard Baker noted in his book Network Security: How to Plan
for it and Achieve It :
One of the biggest obstacles to effective computer
security today is an epidemic of misplaced emphasis.
Corporations spend a lot of time and money buying and
installing elaborate computer security systems to protect
themselves from well -publicized outsiders like youthful
invaders and virus carriers . They do next to nothing to
train employees to make regular backups or to avoid that
stereotype of computer insecurity: the password on a
sticky note attached to the monitor. By one estimate -
really a guess, but a reasonable one - system
administrators who accidentally destroy data by punching
the wrong key outnumber crazed hackers by at least 10 to
1. [Ref. 4]
Lack of training is not the only threat from the users of a
system. It is estimated "that as many as 80 percent of system
penetrations are conducted by fully authorized users who abuse
their access privileges to perform unauthorized functions." [Ref
.
3: p. 16] The Justice Department conducted an analysis of computer
abuse cases and identified the following functions as the points
where data processing systems tended to be the most vulnerable:
[Ref. 4]
• Poor controls over data handling
• Weak or missing physical controls
• Inadequate procedural controls
• Weak ethical standards
• Poor programming practices
• Operating system weaknesses
• Lack of user identification
• Inadequate control over storage media
A "newspaper effect" within some organizations causes many
system administrators to focus on the highly publicized external
threats such as hackers and viruses. As a result, too little
attention is given to basic countermeasures such as backups and
passwords, which can prevent more serious problems from within the
organization.
Networks in particular, suffer from an additional weakness
caused by system administrators focusing on the end system and not
the network as a whole. For example, many network administrators
expend much effort and resources to protect the hosts on the
network, yet pay little or no attention to the overall network.
This is because it is generally easier to protect the hosts rather
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than the entire network, and intruders are more likely to go after
the data on the host. However, there are sound reasons for
protecting the overall network. By focusing on the host alone, the
entire network may be subject to vulnerabilities that are
overlooked. For example, an intruder may be able to divert
transmitted data to an off -site host for examination or to search
for passwords. Human error, in the form of a misconfigured host
could lead to a degradation in service for network users. Or, a
denial of service attack may be generated without the attacker ever
penetrating the system. By focusing on the entire network,
vulnerabilities such as these should be identified.
C. ATTACKS ON COMPUTER NETWORKS
Attacks on a computer network may be passive or active.
Passive attacks include eavesdropping and monitoring transmissions
to gather information. The information may be gained either
directly from the contents of a message or indirectly through
traffic analysis. Traffic analysis is a more subtle form of
passive attack, but one which should not be neglected when securing
a system. Usually passive attacks are difficult to detect since
information is not changed in any way. Most security techniques to
guard against such attacks are preventive in nature rather than
geared toward detection.
Unlike passive attacks, active attacks involve the
modification of information or the insertion of false information.
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Active attacks are typically divided into four main categories:
masquerade, replay, modification, and denial of service.
• A masquerade occurs when one person or group pretends to be
someone else. (A masquerade normally includes another form
of active attack as well.)
• A replay occurs when the contents of a message is captured
and then retransmitted to produce an unauthorized effect.
• If part of a legitimate message is altered, delayed, or
reordered, then a modification attack has taken place. The
modification category also includes attacks by malicious
software which alter the contents of a file.
• If the normal use or management of a system is prevented or
constrained in any way, then a denial of service attack has
been implemented. A denial of service attack can also
result from the introduction of malicious software which
consumes system resources.
Unlike passive attacks, active attacks are generally difficult to
prevent. The goal in dealing with active attacks is normally to
detect them and then recover from any disruption or delays they may
have caused
.
Using the three main goals of computer security (secrecy,
integrity, and availability) , attacks on computer systems fall
under four main categories: interruption, interception,
modification, and fabrication. [Ref . 2: pp. 7-8]
• Interruption is an attack on the availability of a system in
which part of the system is either destroyed or becomes
unavailable
.
• Interception occurs when an unauthorized entity gains access
to the system, attacking the system's confidentiality.
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• If an unauthorized person gains access and tampers with the
system or the information it maintains, then a modification
has occurred and the system's integrity has been attacked.
• A fabrication has occurred if an unauthorized user inserts
false information into the system, affecting its
authenticity.
D . COUNTERMEASURES
Once the vulnerabilities and threats to a system have been
determined, specific countermeasures to prevent or recover from the
effects of these risks must be implemented. There are numerous
types of countermeasures available. Computer security
countermeasures focus on the operating system features which
control access to a system, and communications security measures
are used to protect transmitted information. Countermeasures
associated with communications security are used on computer
networks to control access to the network computers from both
internal and external connections. Finally, physical security
countermeasures are used to protect a computer system from natural
disasters and intruders. Typically, countermeasures of all three
forms will be required for most computer systems.
"It is anticipated that by the year 2000, information will
account for a larger portion of the U.S. gross national product
than manufactured products and other physical commodities." [Ref
.
1] With this increased reliance on information, the security
mechanisms required to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of the information must be widely implemented.
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Driving these security requirements is the U.S. government.
Each year, the government classifies approximately 6.8 billion
pieces of information which must be protected. [Ref . 3: p. 18] To
ensure the information is protected uniformly throughout the
government, standards were required. The development of standards
began in 1965 with the passing of the Brooks Act. Since then,
numerous government efforts have been aimed at achieving a uniform
management of federal Information Technology (IT) resources. As a
result, a foundation has been formed over the past 30 years for all
aspects of IT management
.
E. THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT COMPUTER SECURITY INITIATIVES
Computer security efforts began in the 1950 's when the first
TEMPEST security standard was developed. TEMPEST refers to
"technology that shields computer equipment to keep
electronmagnetic emissions from being intercepted and deciphered by
eavesdroppers." [Ref. 3: p. 17] Also during the 1950' s the U.S.
Communications Security (COMSEC) Board was established. Composed
of representatives from various branches of the government, COMSEC
was given the oversight responsibility for protecting classified
information. In addition, some early system designs were developed
with security features built-in.
It wasn't until the 1960's, however, that public awareness was
raised concerning computer security. During that decade, numerous
initiatives were started by the Department of Defense (DOD) , the
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National Security Agency (NSA) , and the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) . Specifically:
• The Automatic Data Processing Equipment Act (better known as
the Brooks Act) was passed by Congress in 1965. As a
consequence of this act, the NBS was placed in charge of
researching and developing standards for the procurement and
use of federal computer systems. Initially, NBS efforts
were focused on evaluating the existing systems and studying
the government's computer security requirements. During the
1970' s, NBS efforts shifted to developing computer security
standards in two distinct areas: building and evaluating
secure systems and cryptography. Several seminars and
workshops were held to define the problems facing federal
computer systems and to develop solutions to these problems.
As a result, numerous reports were generated with the
conclusion that computer security required attention in
three areas: policy, mechanisms, and assurance. Policy was
needed to state the security rules required to ensure the
security of sensitive information. Hardware and software
mechanisms would be used to enforce the policy, and the
enforcement should provide a reasonable level of assurance
that the policy was supported even when a computer system
was subjected to threats.
• To develop the policy, mechanisms, and required assurance
proposed by the NBS efforts, three specific actions were
recommended. First, a detailed computer security policy for
sensitive information was needed. Second, a formal security
evaluation and accreditation process was required that would
include the publication of a list of approved products for
handling sensitive information; and third, a standard,
formalized technical means of evaluating the overall
security of a system was needed. The task of developing an
initial set of computer security evaluation criterion was
assigned to the Mitre Corporation. To fulfill the other
tasks, the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored
several public seminars. As a result of the seminars, the
NSA was placed in charge of increasing the use of trusted
information security products within DOD.
In 1967, DOD assembled a task force within the Advanced
Research Project Agency (ARPA) to study the potential
threats to DOD computer systems and information. The task
force worked for two years examining computer systems and
networks, identifying vulnerabilities and threats, and
establishing methods for protecting and controlling access
to government computers and information. In 1970, the task
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force published its report, Security Controls for Computer
Systems, which has been viewed by many as a landmark
publication in the history of computer security. [Ref . 3:
p. 28] The research that followed this report led to
numerous programs aimed at protecting classified information
and setting computer security standards. In 1972, a
directive and an accompanying manual was issued by DOD
establishing a consistent policy for computer controls and
techniques
.
The initiatives started during the 1960 's continued into the
1970' s. Government and industry sponsored "tiger teams" were
organized to attempt to break into computer systems in order to
find security holes and then correct them. The teams were
effective at finding numerous security gaps. However, it soon
became apparent that the only means of "guaranteeing" system
security was to design verifiable protection mechanisms into the
systems from the beginning.
In addition to the tiger teams, a number of research projects
aimed at identifying security requirements, formulating security
policy models, and defining recommended guidelines and controls
were initiated. As a result, several concepts and reports were
produced. For example, the concept of a reference monitor was
introduced by James P. Anderson. The reference monitor is used to
"enforce the authorized access relationship between subjects and
objects of a system." [Ref. 3: p. 30] Also during the 1970' s,
David Bell and Leonard LaPadula developed the first mathematical
model of DOD security policy which has become known as the Bell and
LaPadula model . Both the reference monitor concept and the Bell
and LaPadula model were included in later government computer
security standards.
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Most of the government efforts aimed at developing a secure
system during the 1970 's were pointed toward the formation of a
security kernel
.
The kernel is part of the operating system which
controls access to system resources. An initiative funded by the
Air Force eventually led to the development of security mechanisms
for the Multiplexed Information and Computing Service (MULTICS)
system. MULTICS was a large-scale, highly interactive system that
offered both hardware and software security features. Users with
different security clearances could simultaneously access different
levels of classified information. MULTICS was extremely important
because it provided the foundation for the later development of
other secure systems.
In an attempt to focus national attention and resources on
computer security, the DOD Computer Security Initiative was
announced in 1977. Under this initiative, a series of seminars
were held with participants from both government and industry
addressing the following questions: [Ref . 3: p. 32]
• Are secure computer systems useful and feasible?
• What mechanisms should be developed to evaluate and approve
secure computer systems?
• How can computer vendors be encouraged to develop secure
computer systems?
To expand upon the work completed under the DOD Computer
Security Initiative, NSA created the DOD Computer Security Center
(CSC) on 2 January 1981. During the following years, the role of
the CSC was modified to encompass all federal systems and the name
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changed to the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) in August
1985. The center's role since its beginning has been to evaluate
and promote the use of trusted systems in the federal government.
As such, the NCSC has played a vital role in the field of computer
security over the years
.
In August 1983, the NCSC published the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
,
also known as the Orange Book. The
publication was based on the criterion developed by the Mitre
Corporation and other earlier security developments such as the
Bell-Lapadula Model. [Ref . 3: p. 35] Since its publication, the
TCSEC has become "the Bible of secure system development,"
describing the criterion used to assess the level of trust that can
be placed on a particular computer system. Products are submitted
to the NCSC by vendors requesting an evaluation for a specified
level of trust. Upon the successful completion of the evaluation
process, the products are added to the center's Evaluated Products
List.
Since the issuance of the TCSEC, NCSC has also provided a
series of additional publications which are used to interpret
various aspects of the criterion including network communications,
security subsystems, and specialty products. These publications
are referred to as the Rainbow Series
.
The field of computer security has continued to develop since
the publication of the TCSEC. However, since the focus of this
thesis deals with the TCSEC and its application today, the
18
discussion of computer security developments will stop at this




III. THE TRUSTED COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) , or
Orange Book, was first published by the National Computer Security
Center (NCSC) in August 1983. In 1985, the original publication
was revised slightly and reissued in December. Since its initial
publication, the TCSEC has provided the ground rules for evaluating
the level of trust that can be given to a specific computer system.
As Russell and Gangemi state in Computer Security Basics , the TCSEC
"effectively makes security a measurable commodity so a buyer can
identify the exact level of security required for a particular
system, application, or environment." [Ref . 3]
The TCSEC measures trust through two perspectives - security
policy and assurance. Security policy provides the rules that are
to be enforced by a system's security features. Assurance refers
to the trust that can be placed in a system, and includes the
methods used to "prove" the security features have been developed,
tested, documented, maintained, and delivered to a customer. At
the lower levels, assurance is gained mostly through the testing of
the system. At the higher levels, assurance is derived more from
a rigorous approach to system design and implementation.
The TCSEC defines four broad divisions of security protection
which, in increasing order, are: D - Minimal Security, C -
Discretionary Protection, B - Mandatory Protection, and A -
Verified Protection. Each division is further refined into one or
more numbered classes. The higher the number, the greater the
level of protection afforded within the division.
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Each class is defined by a specific set of criterion that must
be met to be awarded the rating of that class. The criteria fall
into four main categories: security policy, accountability,
assurance, and documentation. The levels of trust are cumulative
with each building upon the requirements of lower classes. A brief
description of each division is provided in section B of this
chapter.
A. FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The TCSEC dictates that trusted systems will control access to
all information through the use of specific security features.
These features must ensure that only authorized users (or processes
operating on behalf of the users) will have access to the
information. Furthermore, the access permitted will be based on
the capabilities (i.e., read, write, create, delete) that have been
authorized for the user. To ensure the security, six fundamental
requirements were created: [Ref . 5: pp. 3-4]
• Requirement 1 - SECURITY POLICY - There must be an explicit
and well-defined security policy enforced by the system.
Given identified subjects and objects, there must be a set
of rules that are used by the system to determine whether a
given subject can be permitted to gain access to a specific
object. Computer systems of interest must enforce a
mandatory security policy that can effectively implement
access rules for handling sensitive (e.g., classified)
information. These rules include requirements such as: No
person lacking proper personnel security clearance shall
obtain access to classified information. In addition,
discretionary security controls are required to ensure that
only selected users or groups of users may obtain access to
data (e.g., based on a need-to-know).
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• Requirement 2 - MARKING - Access control labels must be
associated with objects. In order to control access to
information stored in a computer, according to the rules of
a mandatory security policy, it must be possible to mark
every object with a label that reliably identifies the
object's sensitivity level (e.g., classification), and/or
the modes of access accorded those subjects who may
potentially access the object.
• Requirement 3 - IDENTIFICATION - Individual subjects must be
identified. Each access to information must be mediated
based on who is accessing the information and what classes
of information they are authorized to deal with. This
identification and authorization information must be
securely maintained by the computer system and be associated
with every active element that performs some
security- relevant action in the system.
• Requirement 4 - ACCOUNTABILITY - Audit information must be
selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting
security can be traced to the responsible party. A trusted
system must be able to record the occurrences of
security- relevant events in an audit log. The capability to
select the audit events to be recorded is necessary to
minimize the expense of auditing and to allow efficient
analysis. Audit data must be protected from modification
and unauthorized destruction to permit detection and
after-the-fact investigations of security violations.
• Requirement 5 - ASSURANCE - The computer system must contain
hardware/software mechanisms that can be independently
evaluated to provide sufficient assurance that the system
enforces requirements 1 through 4 above. In order to
assure that the four requirements of Security Policy,
Marking, Identification, and Accountability are enforced by
a computer system, there must be some identified and unified
collection of hardware and software controls that perform
those functions. These mechanisms are typically embedded in
the operating system and are designed to carry out the
assigned tasks in a secure manner. The basis for trusting
such system mechanisms in their operational setting must be
clearly documented such that it is possible to independently
examine the evidence to evaluate their sufficiency.
• Requirement 6 - CONTINUOUS PROTECTION - The trusted
mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be
continuously protected against tampering and/or unauthorized
changes. No computer system can be considered truly secure
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if the basic hardware and software mechanisms that enforce
the security policy are themselves subject to unauthorized
modification or subversion. The continuous protection
requirement has direct implications throughout the computer
system's life-cycle.
Requirements 1 and 2 deal with a system's policy, 3 and 4 reflect
the system's accountability, and 5 and 6 deal with the level of
assurance offered by a system. It was from these six requirements
that the actual evaluation criterion were derived.
B. DIVISIONS OF TRUST
1. Division D: Minimal Protection
Division D contains only one class and is reserved for those
systems which fail to meet a higher assurance level . Given the
amount of time and money required for a vendor to submit a system
for evaluation, systems are normally not submitted for this rating.
However, if a system fails to meet the Class Cl requirements, it
may receive a Class D rating.
2. Division C: Discretionary Protection
Division C consists of two classes, Cl and C2 . Systems
certified at this division of trust must provide discretionary or
need-to-know protection as well as audit capabilities. The design
of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is central to systems evaluated
at this level and higher. The TCB provides a separation of users
and data so the access controls may be implemented.
Class Cl systems provide discretionary security protection by
providing a separation between users and data. The environment in
which a Cl system is used is expected to be one of cooperation with
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users processing data at the same level of sensitivity. At the CI
level, users are permitted to log into the system as a group, using
a shared password.
Class C2 is referred to as the Controlled Access Protection
class. Systems certified at this level provide access control that
is granularized to the individual user. Login procedures, auditing
capabilities, and resource isolation all hold users individually
accountable for their actions. In a Class C2 environment, each
user must log into the system using a unique password or
identifier. Shared passwords are not permitted. In addition,
object reuse features must be present to prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of information.
3. Division B: Mandatory Protection
The TCB is used to maintain the integrity of sensitivity
labels which are used to enforce a set of mandatory access control
rules. The sensitivity labels must be used with all major data
structures in the system. As part of the product evaluation, the
system developer must provide the security policy model and
specifications on which the TCB is based. In addition, it must be
clear that the reference monitor concept was used in the design of
the system.
The B division consists of three separate classes. Class Bl
introduces Mandatory Access Control (MAC) through the addition of
labels. An informal statement of the security policy model, data
labeling, and MAC for named subjects and objects must be included
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in the system design. Sensitivity labeling must also be provided
for all exported information.
The differences between Classes C2 and Bl protection are
minimal. Theodore M.P. Lee presents an interesting analysis of
these ratings for systems operating in compartmented mode. With
compartmented mode, some system users are not formally authorized
access to all of the information maintained on the system. In his
paper "A Note on Compartmented Mode: To B2 or not B2?", Mr. Lee
recommends a rating of B2 or higher for compartmented mode systems
.
[Ref. 6]
Class B2 provides structured protection by building on the
capabilities provided in Class Bl . Class B2 is the first level
where the reference monitor concept is substantially implemented
into the system design. The TCB must be based on a clearly defined
and documented formal security model that provides both
discretionary and mandatory access control to all levels of the
system. The TCB is carefully structured into protection-critical
and non-protection-critical elements with a well defined interface.
The system must be relatively resistant to penetration and covert
channels must be addressed. Products submitted for evaluation at
this level are subjected to a more thorough test and review than
those submitted for lower classifications.
Class B3 provides security domains with the reference monitor
concept fully enforced. The system must be designed' with
complexity minimized and non-essential code excluded. Support is
provided to the system administrator through expanded auditing
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capabilities and system recovery procedures. The search for covert
channels is also expanded to include both storage and timing
channels. Should a system failure occur, trusted recovery features
must be implemented to ensure the recovery of resources without a
compromise of data. Finally, more extensive documentation of the
system security features is required for a Class B3 evaluation.
4. Division A: Verified Protection
Formal security verification methods are used to ensure the
system's mandatory and discretionary access controls will
effectively protect classified and sensitive information. This
level requires extensive documentation to be submitted during the
evaluation process. Class Al, verified design, is the only class
currently listed in this division. Functionally, the requirements
for Al are equivalent to those for a B3 certification, with the
addition of trusted distribution. Trusted distribution provides
control over the integrity of the data describing the TCB
.
Procedures must be implemented to ensure any data updates
distributed to customers precisely match the master copies.
The main difference between the B3 and Al classes results from
the analysis and verification techniques used on the formal design.
The techniques result in a higher level of assurance that the TCB
is correctly implemented. In addition, more stringent
configuration management is required.
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c. ENSURING TRUST
Given enough time and resources, any computer system can be
penetrated or subverted regardless of the trust engineering and
security features that are provided. Therefore, the TCSEC measures
the level of trust that can be provided by a system to ensure the
system will enforce the security policy over time. The TCSEC
defines a trusted system as one "that employs sufficient hardware
and software integrity measures to allow its use to simultaneously
process a range of sensitive unclassified or classified (e.g.,
confidential through top secret) information for a diverse set of
users without violating access privileges." [Ref . 5] "Inherent to
the concept of trust is some assurance that the trusted person or
entity possesses the required strength, capability, and integrity
to merit that trust." [Ref. 7: p. 13] The trust is actually built
from the bottom or hardware level up, with each layer "trusting"








Figure 1: Trust Hierarchy in a Computer System [Ref 7]
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their services reliably and accurately. Figure 1 was taken from
NCSC's Assessing Controlled Access Protection [Ref . 7] and
describes this layering of trust graphically.
Several different concepts are used in order to achieve these
various levels of trust. The following sections provide a brief
synopsis of the major concepts used throughout the TCSEC.
1. Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
Central to the idea of a trusted system is the concept of a
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) . The TCB is used to refer to the
mechanisms that enforce a system's security and is defined as:
The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer
system - including hardware, firmware, and software - the
combination of which is responsible for enforcing a
security policy. It creates a basic protection
environment and provides additional user services
required for a trusted computer system. The ability of
a trusted computing base to correctly enforce a security
policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB
and on the correct input by system administrative
personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance)
related to the security policy. [Ref. 5]
Normally the TCB does not include the entire system. Part of the
analysis of any product submitted for evaluation is the
identification of the TCB (i.e., the architecture, assurance
mechanisms, and security features that work together to form the
TCB) . Once identified, the TCB is evaluated to determine how well
it is protected from tampering and interference.
The size and structure of the TCB will vary across the
different classes of trust. At the Class C2 level, the TCB will
normally be large, dispersed, and unstructured. This presents a
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challenge to both evaluators and system administrators for assuring
and maintaining the system's security. As a system progresses up
the trust hierarchy, the TCB typically becomes smaller and more
structured. At the B2 level, the TCB may still be large. However,
due to increased structure in the software engineering designs and
use of hardware protection features, the modularity increases,
resulting in a system that is easier to understand, evaluate, and
maintain. Finally, systems meeting the B3 and Al levels of trust
generally have TCB's which are small, layered, and highly
structured permitting more rigorous testing and evaluation to be
conducted.
2. Subjects and Objects
The terms subjects and objects are typically used to refer to
the entities of a computer system. Subjects are active entities
such as people, processes, or devices, which can cause information
to flow within the system or can cause the state of the system to
change
.
Objects are passive devices that contain or receive
information. Files, directories, directory trees, records,
segments, printers, network nodes, clocks, keyboards, and
processors are all examples of objects. Access to an object is
associated to a subject through a right or access mode. When a
subject is authorized access to an object, access is also
authorized to the information contained in the object. The set of
objects that a subject is able to access is referred to as the
subject's domain.
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3 . Reference Monitor
The reference monitor is used to enforce "the authorized
access relationships between subjects and objects of a system."
[Ref . 3: p. 107] The reference monitor serves as an interface
between a subject and the object to which the subject seeks access.
When a request is made, the reference monitor accepts the request,
consults the appropriate access control information, and then
permits or denies access to the object accordingly. Any reference
to an object must be validated against the access control
information, even if it is a reference by another program.
The mechanism used to implement the reference monitor in a
system must meet three design requirements: isolation,
completeness, and verifiability . Isolation means the mechanism
must be tamper proof. To achieve completeness, the monitor must be
used for every access decision without being bypassed, and the
monitor must be capable of being analyzed and tested for
verification.
The security kernel is the operating system mechanism that is
normally used to implement the reference monitor concept. As such,
it supervises all system activity in accordance with the system's
security policy. In following with the design principles outlined
above, the TCSEC dictates that the security kernel "must mediate
all access, be protected from modification, and be verifiable as
correct." [Ref. 5] The security kernel is typically viewed as the
heart of the TCB . (Note: the reference monitor concept does not
apply to a Class C2 system.)
31
4. Bell and LaPadula Model
Models are used to precisely express a system's security
requirements. All mechanisms used to support the security policy
must conform to the selected model for the system. The Bell and
LaPadula model was the first mathematical model for DOD security
policy and was the model selected for use with the TCSEC. The
model provides a formal description of the paths over which
information is allowed to flow in a secure system and applies
strictly to the secrecy of the information. The paths are
important since they describe acceptable relationships between
subjects and objects at different levels of sensitivity. The
following provides the details of the model:
Each system covers a set of subjects S and a set of
objects 0. For each subject s in S and each object o in
there is a fixed security class C(s) and C(o) . The
security classes are ordered by a relation <.
Two properties characterize the secure flow of information:
Simple Security Property: A subject s may have read access to
an object o only if C(o) < C(s)
.
-Property: A subject s who has read access to an object o
may have write access to an object p only if C(o) < C(p) .
[Ref. 8: pp. 249-250]
5 . Discretionary and Mandatory Access Control
The features of a computer system which enable access to an
object to be restricted are referred to as access control
mechanisms. The controls may be implemented through hardware or
software features, operating procedures, or management procedures.
If access is restricted based upon the identity of the user or
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group of users, then a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policy is
used. Under a DAC policy, an authorized user is capable of passing
permissions to another user. For example, one user can share a
file with another user and permit him/her to modify the file.
In contrast, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) provides a
stricter policy than DAC. Under a MAC policy, access to system
objects is restricted according to the sensitivity of the
information contained in the object and the authorization level of
the subject to access that information. The sensitivity of the
information is represented by a security level associated with the
object, and the subject's authorization level is normally
represented by a clearance. Under a strictly MAC policy, users are
not permitted to share files or to pass permissions to other users.
Any access control policy is either mandatory or
discretionary. The policy is a "MAC policy if, and only if, it can
be represented by a partially ordered set of access classes,-
otherwise, it is discretionary." [Ref . 9] A key distinction
between the two forms is the level of protection provided against
malicious software. For example, a Trojan Horse can bypass DAC
controls, but cannot bypass the controls of a MAC policy. This can
be demonstrated through mathematical algorithms. Specifically,
with a DAC policy, an algorithm which determines whether an
arbitrary protection system will ever result in unauthorized access
to information cannot be devised. [Ref. 10] However, with a MAC
policy, it is possible to construct a lattice of access classes and
mathematically prove that access control is always enforced.
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6 . Protection Mechanisms
Mechanisms are functional features of a computer system which
are designed to enforce the security policy and accountability
objectives. The mechanisms addressed by the TCSEC include:
identification and authentication, Discretionary Access Control
(DAC) , object reuse, and audit capabilities. [Ref. 7: p. 22]
Identification and authentication is normally achieved by
asking for a login name followed by a prompt for some sort of
"proof" that the user is in fact the person to which the login name
is assigned. The login name achieves the identification and the
"proof" is used for authentication. Three types of "proof" are
used for most systems: "(1) something the user knows (e.g., a
password); (2) something the user has (e.g., an authentication
device); or (3) something the user is (e.g., a retinal scan)."
[Ref. 7: p. 23] Most products on the Evaluated Products List (EPL)
use the login name and password combination to accomplish
identification and authentication.
The DAC mechanism is used to restrict access to objects based
upon the identity of a subject. Access Control Lists (ACLs)
,
protection bits, capabilities, profiles, and passwords are the main
mechanisms used to implement DAC. ACLs are associated with objects
and identify subjects with authorized access as well as the type of
access granted. Protection bits identify access privileges
through a bit vector, with each bit representing a different type
of access (e.g., read, write, etc.) . The protection bits may be
assigned according to specific categories of users (e.g., owner,
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group, public) to implicitly associate access rights with
individual users. Capabilities may be assigned to a user for
protected objects with access being granted to a subject only if he
or she has the appropriate capability. Profiles associate a
listing of protected objects to each user which identifies the
objects to which the subject has been granted access. Finally,
passwords may be used to permit full (all types) or partial
(different types such as read only) access to objects.
Despite the specific mechanism used to implement DAC within a
computer system, all DAC implementations are susceptible to attack
by a Trojan Horse. Specifically, when a DAC program executes, it
uses the access privileges of the user initiating the program. A
Trojan Horse will utilize these permissions to pass or modify
information in a manner not intended by the user. If separating
classified information is left to the user's discretion, then a
Trojan Horse can result in an unauthorized disclosure of
information. Therefore, DAC mechanisms are not sufficient for
segregating objects with different classification levels. A Guide
to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted Systems
provides a more detailed description of the Trojan Horse problem.
[Ref. 11: pp. 5-6]
Object reuse provides assurance that information is not
available to other users once storage space has been reallocated.
Table 1 was taken from NCSC's Assessing Controlled Access
Protection document and outlines the various object reuse
mechanisms for the various types of storage objects.
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The audit criterion requires that the computer system be
capable of collecting information regarding system events. The
audit features provide a record of security related events which
may be examined either as the events are occurring or
retrospectively. Once the audit mechanism collects the event data,
Storage Object Imp 1ementation
Primary Storage
(e.g., random access memory,
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- Overwriting memory page with
fixed or random pattern
and/or (for efficiency) new
data
Fixed Media
(e.g., fixed disk, terminal,
operator console)
- Overwriting physical data
blocks
- Purging associated entries
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Table 1. Object Reuse Mechanisms [Ref 7]
the TCB must protect it from unauthorized modification or
destruction. At a minimum, the audit mechanism must be able to
record the following types of events: [Ref 7: p. 31]
• System logins
• Introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g.,
file open, file creation, program execution, file copy)
• Deletion of objects from a user's address space (e.g., file
close, completion of program execution, file deletion)
• Actions taken by system administrators and/or system
security personnel (e.g., adding a user)
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• All security relevant events (e.g., use of privileges,
changes to DAC parameters)
• Print requests
In addition to the type of event recorded, the audit mechanism
must identify the time and date of the event, the origin of the
request, whether it was a success or failure, and provide a unique
identifier representing the subject who requested or "supposedly"
requested the event. If the event is the introduction or deletion
of an object to a user's address space, then the name of the object
must be recorded. Finally, any actions taken by the system
administrator must be described in the audit trail
.
D. PRODUCT EVALUATION
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) evaluates
operating systems and other products according to the criterion set
forth in the TCSEC through the Trusted Product Evaluation Program
(TPEP) . TPEP is the primary program of the NCSC and is aimed
specifically at Commercial Of f -The-Shelf (COTS) products which meet
the needs of the government. To be certified at a specific level
of trust, the product and vendor must complete both a preliminary
product evaluation and a formal product evaluation. Once a product
is assigned a specific rating, it is placed on the Evaluated
Products List with its assigned rating. The Rating Maintenance
Program (RAMP) allows for technological advancements, by permitting
software changes and new hardware platforms to be added to the
evaluated package.
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It is important to remember that although a system is assigned
a specific rating, that rating pertains only to the hardware
platform on which the testing was completed. Therefore, if an
operating system was assigned a Class C2 rating on a Compaq
Proliant 2000 without floppy drives, the Class C2 rating would not
be transferrable to a different platform such as a Gateway 2000 P5-
120 with floppy drives. In addition, products evaluated according
to the TCSEC do not maintain that rating when used in a networked
environment. The TCSEC focuses strictly on stand-alone systems
which are not interconnected with other systems.
As the number of computer networks continues to grow, the need
for products evaluated for a networked environment is rapidly
increasing. Evaluations for networked products follow an expanded
testing process based upon the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI)
or Red Book. (The TNI will be discussed in further detail in the
next chapter.) The evaluation process used to assess the security
characteristics of a product in a networked environment is referred
to as the TPEP Network Evaluation.
Although the analysis performed by the TPEP or TPEP Network
Evaluation provides valuable information for the security of a
system, it does not replace the need for system approval and
accreditation. Every environment is unique and must be analyzed
for the overall security of the system and the data to be processed
by the system. The accreditation process provides an avenue for
this unique evaluation to be conducted.
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E. CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
Certification and accreditation are the terms used to describe
the process of analyzing a computer system to determine the level
of security afforded based upon a defined security policy and a set
of security features. Specifically, certification refers to the
technical evaluation of a system and accreditation is the formal
declaration that a system is approved to operate in a specific
security mode for a specified period of time.
Accreditation assigns responsibility for the operation of the
system to the Designated Approving Authority (DAA) . Some types of
systems may actually require more than one DAA, depending on the
environment and the amount of interface with other systems . For
example, a system that is connected to a backbone network or a
system that supports multiple organizations will require more than
one DAA.
Prior to allowing any computer system to process or store
classified or sensitive information, the DAA must complete the
certification and accreditation process for the system to operate
in one of three security modes
:
• Dedicated Mode: All users have the appropriate clearance
and need-to-know for all of the data processed by the
computer system.
• System High: All users have the proper security clearance,
but may not have a need-to-know for all of the data
processed by the computer system.
• Mul t i 1eve 1 Mode
:
Permits two or more classification levels
of data to be processed simultaneously within the computer
system. Not all of the users have the appropriate clearance
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or access approval for all of the data maintained by the
system.
NCSC standard 003-85, Guidance for Applying the Department of
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific
Environments [Ref
. 12], provides the government's policy for
computer systems which handle classified, sensitive, and
unclassified information, as well as details regarding the
selection of the appropriate level of trust for any environment.
The level of trust is determined by computing the system' s risk
index which is defined as "the disparity between the minimum
clearance or authorization of system users and the maximum
sensitivity of data processed by a system." [Ref. 12: p. 5] The
risk index is then used in conjunction with a table to determine
the appropriate level of trust for the system' s environment
.
The certification process is the set of procedures used to
determine if a system meets the specific security requirements for
the operational environment. If all requirements are met, the
system will then be accredited by the DAA as meeting the required
level of trust. The certification and accreditation process is
needed to ensure system users and administrators are able to "trust
the system's ability to accurately, consistently, and positively
identify each user, and to maintain that positive identification
throughout the user's login session. Otherwise, controlled access
protection could not be assured, and any audit information
collected would be rendered useless." [Ref. 7: p. 22] Specific
details regarding who should conduct the certification, the steps
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involved in the process, and risk management are provided in the
following sections.
1. System Analysts
NCSC recommends the actual system analysis be performed by a
team of individuals to ensure the required levels of controlled
access protection are provided. All members of the team should
have the equivalent of at least a bachelor's degree in Computer
Science or Computer Engineering. In addition, at least one member
should have expertise in the hardware architectures and all members
should have a strong knowledge of the operating systems and a
thorough understanding of computer security issues. Prior to
analyzing the system, the team should be fully educated on the
system's mission, environment, security policy, and any identified
threats. [Ref . 7: p. 41]
2 . Technical Analysis
The certification and accreditation of a system is performed
through a series of interdependent steps. NCSC's Introduction to
Certification and Accreditation [Ref. 13] manual provides a
detailed description of these steps which are briefly described
below.
• Step 1. Assess System Requirements /Assess Tailoring
Factors: The focus of this step is to identify and assess
the aspects of the system which are relevant to security.
This includes functional requirements, security policies,
threat information, mission requirements, security
boundaries, and other pertinent data.
• Step 2. Plan for Certification & Accreditation: System
milestones and resource requirements such as personnel
training and equipment purchases should be identified.
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Information to conduct the actual system analysis is
incorporated into system documentation.
• Step 3. Perform System Analysis: The system security
attributes as a whole are analyzed. Security measures are
assessed and tested with system vulnerabilities and risks
identified.
• Step 4. Report Findings/Recommendations : The results and
recommendations of the previous phases are documented and a
certification/accreditation package is developed. The
package provides the DAA with a recommendation for an
accreditation decision, a statement of residual risk and
supporting documentation.
• Step 5. Conduct Site Survey: An optional step, a site
survey is conducted by the DAA or his/her representative to
ensure the security countermeasures meet the system
requirements
.
• Step 6. Make Accreditation Decision: The DAA makes the
accreditation decision using one of the following options:
full accreditation for the originally intended environment,
partial accreditation for operation outside the originally
intended environment, interim accreditation approval, or
accreditation disapproval. If multiple DAAs are involved,
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) must be developed and signed
as part of the accreditation decision.
• Step 7. Maintain Accreditation: Accreditation must be
maintained throughout the system's life cycle by ensuring
operation continues within the stated parameters of
accreditation. Current DOD policy requires a system to be
reaccredited every three years, regardless of any changes
that may or may not have occurred.
Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the overall
certification and accreditation process. In addition to these
steps, the actual system analysis (step 3) may be further broken
down into a separate set of steps. Assessing Controlled Access
Protection [Ref . 7] describes each of these steps in detail and
























Figure 2 . Certification and Accreditation Process
[Ref. 13: p. 8]
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3 . Risk Management
"Because absolute security is neither technically nor
theoretically attainable in a multi-user system, determining
whether a system is 'secure' is essentially an exercise in
identifying risks and counterbalancing those risks against
protection mechanisms. Therefore, the ultimate objective of any
security program is risk management." [Ref. 7: p. 53] Risk
management encompasses the total process of identifying, measuring,
and minimizing uncertain events which can affect the computer
system.
Risk management begins with a risk analysis of the computer
system which evaluates the relative costs and benefits of security
measures and identifies those measures which are acceptable to
reduce the level of risks to the system. The term risk is used to
identify a measure of the potential loss to a computer system from
a threat and the system's vulnerability to that threat. Risk
analysis is an on-going process which occurs throughout a system'
s
life cycle. As such, it is a tool used by the DAA to ensure the
system's security policy is being enforced at an appropriate level
relative to the assumed risks. Once a system is accredited, the
need for risk analysis/management does not end, rather it begins.
There are numerous checklists available which may be used to
assist with risk management. For example, the book Computer
Security: A Comprehensive Controls Checklist [Ref. 14] provides a
very thorough checklist for assessing the threats to a computer
system. The checklist was designed for an Air Force installation
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and "provides a number of controls for each major type of threat
against an information system." [Ref . 14: p. 11] The controls are
presented in list form with provisions for three possible answers:
yes, no, and not applicable. For a control to be applicable, the
threat must exist and an asset must need protection. If the control
is applicable, then a "yes" or "no" is checked to represent that
the control does or does not exist within the system. The book also
describes how to assign weights to the various requirements so
priorities may be assigned. The areas addressed by the various
checklists include: personnel policies, system development,
training/awareness, organization structure, physical access, data
and program access, input /output, processing operations, database





IV. THE TRUSTED NETWORK INTERPRETATION
Many of the mechanisms defined by the TCSEC are applicable to
networked environments as well. However, the TCSEC provides no
guidance for its application to networks. In addition, the TCSEC
is void in two major areas where networks are concerned. First,
while the TCSEC addresses single-system security, networks
typically involve many systems with different architectures and
different security vulnerabilities. In today's environment of
piecemeal systems being interconnected to form a network, an
evaluation criterion which helps to ensure a secure network without
requiring every component of the network to be fully trusted is
needed. By providing explicit design criterion for networks,
system designers will be forced to think about the placement of
trust within the overall network. Second, the TCSEC primarily
addresses the computer security goals of secrecy and integrity by
focusing on access to information written on a computer system. Two
additional goals, availability and authenticity, are extremely
important in networked environments. Because of these voids and
due to concerns regarding the transmission of government data over
communication networks, a standard format to be used with the
evaluation of computer networks was needed.
Building upon the criterion set forth in the TCSEC, the NCSC
published the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) of the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria [Ref . 15] or "Red Book" in
1987. The TNI is part of the Rainbow Series and was developed to
provide further guidance for networks and network components . The
47
criterion of the TNI may be used to cover the range of networks
from isolated local area networks to wide area internetworks.
The TNI is divided into two major sections. Part I breaks
down each of the divisions and classes described in the TCSEC and
provides an interpretation of the requirements for a networked
environment. The same divisions and classes of trust are used
(i.e., D, CI, C2, Bl, etc.). Since networks require additional
security services (e.g., availability, communications security),
Part II of the TNI describes specific services which may or may not
be required in a network and furnishes a method for assessing those
services. The security services included are communications
security, denial of service, transmission security, and supportive
services (e.g., encryption tools and network management)
.
Part II of the TNI also describes how the different components
of a network may be categorized according to the type of mechanism
provided. The four categories are Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
,
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) , Audit, and Identification and
Authentication. The TNI abbreviates these categories as M, D, A,
and I, respectively. A network component may be functionally used
for any combination of these categories. Therefore, a total of 16
component types (including no features provided) may be used in a
network. Each component is rated according to the corresponding
TCSEC functional requirements for that category. The C2+ rating is
used to denote that a component meets the Class B3 DAC and audit
functional requirements, but does not provide any MAC features.
Through this rating structure, components may be combined to
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provide an aggregate level of trust. For example, a "D" component
which is rated as C2+ may be combined with other components which
are given a Class B3 or Al rating to produce a Class B3 or Al
system. [Ref
. 16] (This would only work if the "D" component were
given a Class C2+ rating. A Class C2 component could not be
combined in this manner.)
The TNI assigns a minimum and maximum rating for each
component type. Table 2 provides a listing of the possible
component types and the corresponding rating range.
Component Type Minimum Class Maximum Class
M Bl Al
D CI C2 +
I CI C2
A C2 C2 +
DI CI C2 +
DA C2 C2 +
IA C2 C2 +









Table 2 . Component Types and Corresponding Rating Classes
[Ref. 15: p. 196]
PART II SECURITY SERVICES
The security services described in Part II of the TNI are
rated according to their functionality, strength of mechanism, and
level of assurance. Functionality refers to the objective the
security service is to fulfill and the approach used to meet that
objective. The features provided by the service and its
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performance are included under the heading of functionality. The
strength of the mechanism measures how effectively the service
meets its objective. Both direct and indirect threats to the
network must be considered in determining the strength of the
mechanism. Finally, assurance refers to the level of trust the
users may place on the service that it will achieve the desired
functionality. Tamper resistance, verif iability, and the inability
to bypass the service are three aspects which must be considered in
rating the level of assurance.
Evaluation of the services provided in a network is
qualitative and results in a rating of none, minimum, fair, or
good. In some cases, the functionality of a service may be
described as either none or present, if rating the degree of
functionality may not be appropriate. The term none is normally
used to describe if the service does not support the strength of
the mechanism criterion. Finally, if a security service is not
offered, then the term not present is used as the rating. Table 3
was taken from the Trusted Networks Interpretation Environments
Guideline [Ref . 17] and provides a breakdown of the security
services and the range of ratings that may be used for each
criterion.
The security services addressed are not required by every
network. Similarly, the strength of the service required will vary
from network to network according to the operational environment in
which it is used. Selecting the appropriate security services for
a network is a management decision. The Trusted Networks
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Interpretation Environments Guideline [Ref. 17] provides a series
of questions the manager may use to determine the services that are
needed and the functionality required. Once it has been determined
that a service is required and the functionality has been
identified, the strength of the mechanism and the level of
assurance is determined through a risk index which is also provided
in the TNI guideline.

































































Table 3 . Evaluation Structure for Network Security Services
[Ref. 17: p. 27]
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B. ENSURING TRUST
Any network evaluated using the TNI must have a rational
Network Security Architecture and Design (NSAD) which addresses the
security relevant policies, objectives, and protocols. The
interfaces and services which are needed for the network to be
evaluated as a trusted system must be specified as well as the
security functionality of the various components.
Just like a stand-alone system, the network also maintains a
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) which is referred to as the Network
TCB (NTCB)
. The NTCB includes all of the security- relevant
components of the network. In contrast to the "stand-alone system,
the design and evaluation of the network rests on an understanding
of how the security mechanisms are distributed and allocated to
various components, in such a way that the security policy is
supported reliably in spite of (1) the vulnerability of the
communication paths and (2) the concurrent, asynchronous operation
of the network components." [Ref . 15: p. xvii] When a NTCB is
distributed over several network components, the portion of the
NTCB within a given component is referred to as an NTCB partition.
For a network to be evaluated at a specific class, the network
as a whole must meet every requirement for that class as outlined
in Part I of the TNI . This does not mean that every network
component must satisfy all of the requirements. For example, one
component may rely on another component to meet a specific
requirement. Neither component will satisfy the requirement
individually, but together the requirement is met for the network.
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C. CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
Products are submitted to the NCSC for evaluation in a network
environment using the TNI criterion the same way stand-alone
systems are evaluated using the TCSEC . However, since there are
additional security concerns with a network environment, additional
testing is required. Although a product completes the formal
evaluation process conducted by the NCSC and may be certified to
run at a specific level (e.g., Class C2) , the NCSC evaluation
process does not eliminate the need for system certification and
accreditation. As described in the previous chapter, a network
must be evaluated and accredited for operation in its specific
environment the same as a stand-alone computer. However, if the
network uses a commercial product that has been evaluated and
certified by the NCSC, reports from that process may be used as
input to the systems certification.
There are two distinct views which may be used to certify and
accredit a network. It may be viewed as a collection of two or
more interconnected separately accredited computer systems, or it
may be accredited as one large system. The view which is selected
will have a major impact on the security features required and the
level of assurance of the system. Therefore, the desired approach
must be defined prior to the start of the certification process.
1. Interconnected Accredited System View
This view recognizes that parts of a network may be
independently created, managed, and accredited. The interconnected
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system consists of multiple systems which may be viewed as devices
or components to which the other systems may transfer information.
Each individual system or "device" must be assigned a sensitivity
level for the information it processes.
When evaluating an interconnected accredited system, two
additional security problems must be considered: propagation of
local risk and the cascade problem. Propagation of local risk
refers to the security of one system being endangered by a weakness
in another system which is connected to it. Since the overall
system may have several accreditors, one must remember that a risk
which is acceptable to one person may not be acceptable to another.
Special constraints such as one-way connections, cryptographic
isolation, or other measures may be imposed on a system to help
limit the amount of risk introduced to the overall system.
The cascade problem exists when subsystems are connected in a
manner which results in the overall system covering a larger
sensitivity range than the individual systems are accredited to
handle. In this case, an attacker may be able to exploit the
network connections in order to leak information across the range
of sensitivity levels. This depends on the cooperation by
malicious software between the various subsystems. Several
approaches may be taken to prevent this problem from occurring.
• Configuration controls may prohibit the introduction of new
software or software which has not been appropriately
examined
.
• Increasing the trust requirements for the various subsystems
may increase the protection mechanisms to a level that is
appropriate for the potential compromise.
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• Some network connections may need to be eliminated from the
overall system.
Both the TNI and the Trusted Network Interpretation Environments
Guideline discuss the propagation of local risk and the cascade
problem in greater detail. In addition, information is provided on
how the problems may be identified if they exist in a network and
how they may be solved.
Finally, adopting the Interconnected Accredited System view
may result in a very complex system which cannot be practically
evaluated using the TNI criterion. In that case, the system
"accreditor is forced to accept the risk of assessing the security
of the network without the benefit of an evaluation against the
principles of the TCSEC." [Ref. 15: p. xiii]
2. Single Trusted System View
This view treats the overall network as a single trusted
system which is accredited by one authority. "The single trusted
system implements a reference monitor to enforce the accesses of
subjects to objects in accordance with an explicit and well defined
network security policy." [Ref. 15: p. xiv] In addition, the NTCB
is partitioned among the various network components which interact
through the communication channels. The NTCB partitions must be
implemented so the network security policy is enforced for the
network as a whole. This approach is normally not as complex as
the interconnected system approach and may result in a more secure
level of trust in a system.
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V. THE FALCON LAN - APPLYING THE TCSEC/TNI CRITERION
The Naval Security Group Detachment (NSGD) Monterey is the
Naval contingent of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) . As such,
NSGD is responsible for the training and well being of the Navy-
students at DLI. During the fall of 1995, NSGD installed the
Falcon Local Area Network (LAN) to assist with their charter to
provide administrative, educational, and communication support for
both students and staff personnel. The majority of the hardware and
software purchased for the LAN was provided by NSGD's headquarters,
Commander Naval Security Group (CNSG) , and the backbone
installation was performed by NISE WEST.
A. SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY AND GOALS
The NSGD staff has defined the following functional
requirements for the Falcon LAN. Since the initial installation of
the LAN, not all of the requirements have been met. Those which
have not been met are scheduled for future implementation.
• Provide a Communications System: The LAN provided a
backbone communication system for the various NSGD offices
located in two different buildings. Specifically, the LAN
joined the Learning Center and administration offices in
building 629 with the Commander's office and yeoman offices
in building 616 using a client-server structure.
• Provide a Student Tracking System: The LAN included the
development of a unified database for tracking student
information including student course assignment and
completion, barracks room assignments, security clearance
information, past performance information and other
information relating to the individual student
.
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• Provide for Service Management: Access was needed to the
DLI student database, Navy Integrated Training Requirements
and Resources System (NITRAS) , and the Army Training
Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) programs to allow
for the assignment of students to language curriculums to
meet service needs and student eligibility requirements.
• Provide for Supply and Fiscal Tracking: Access was also
required to the Naval Postgraduate School supply system, the
new supply and purchasing system, and on-line catalogs and
supply status servers
.
• Provide Career Counseling Assistance: A provision for the
maintenance and access to the student database with career
counseling information such as Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores, next duty assignment, and
prospective gains and losses was also needed. In addition,
the LAN was to provide the Educational Services Officer with
course completion, Personnel Advancement Requirements (PARS)
and other advancement information and provide personnel with
access to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) bulletin
board and detailer electronic mail.
• Provide for Command Information Dissemination : The LAN was
to provide a route for the dissemination and tracking of
command welcome aboard packages, provide NSGD personnel with
access to the World Wide Web (WWW) server, and provide
outside access to the Defense Language Institute NSGD home
page.
• Allow for the sharing of electronic mail with DLI: Access
to and compatibility with the DLI Microsoft Mail server was
needed to allow the transfer of electronic mail between the
staffs. In conjunction with this, all NSGD Staff and Navy
and Marine students needed electronic mail accounts to allow
for the free exchange of electronic mail within the command
and with other DLI electronic mail users.
• Provide for the Instruction of the Cryptologic Technician
Apprentice Common Core Curriculum using the LAN: To
complete the automation of all NSGD requirements and provide
total connectivity, connections with the Educational LAN in
the Learning Center were needed. This would allow for
interactive CD-ROM instruction of the Cryptologic Technician
Apprentice Common Core Curriculum and provide a CD-ROM
library for access by the LAN.
In addition to the functional requirements specified above,
one additional function was desired for the LAN - to provide the
ability to receive unclassified message traffic using the Defense
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Message System (DMS)
. Currently, all message traffic (classified
and unclassified) is received on a stand-alone personal computer
running an awkward program called Above Board. Unclassified
message traffic is screened and then distributed on the LAN using
a CNSG-approved program called Message Board. The actual progress
made to date in achieving these requirements will be discussed
further in the section on interoperability.
Command goals for the Falcon LAN include: system expansion
into every barracks room, limited access by all students for
educational use, electronic mail use, and remote login to
educational services like the Cryptologic Technician Apprentice
Common Core Curriculum. Additionally, the LAN should be configured
to easily accept future software and hardware expansion and
upgrades. (Note: The software and hardware expansion/upgrades
will require the system to be re-accredited.)
B. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
1. Users
The total number of personnel supported by the Falcon LAN is
approximately 375. This includes access by 35 staff personnel and
approximately 340 students. The mix of students is normally 40
officers and 300 enlisted personnel. Proposed future expansion of
the LAN will also permit access by approximately 100 Marines
stationed at DLI
.
Access to the LAN for the majority of staff personnel is
required between 0630 and 1700 weekdays. The supply officer is the
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exception to these hours, requiring access through 2000. Specific
processing requirements for each of the staff offices are:
• Database Manager and Professional Development: Requires the
ability to access the network for database management and to
input information into the NSGD student database.
• Quota Manager: Requires the ability to access and update
the NSGD student database and the DLI student database, to
access the CNET's NITRAS and the Army ATRRS programs, and to
access the BUPERS bulletin board and electronic mail
services
.
• Division Officer and Information Security Manager: Requires
LAN access for database management and access to the NSGD
student database.
• Supply Officer: The supply officer is responsible for
ordering over 400 supply items, administering a $100,000 per
year budget and maintaining all controlled equipage. Unique
requirements for this office include the ability to access
the supply HICK (hazardous material list) , FedLog (stock
number access) , Naval Logistics Library, and Perform Pro
(Government forms)
.
• Command Career Counselor and Educational Services Officer:
Requires the ability to input information into the NSGD
student database
.
• Yeoman: The Yeomen are divided into two sections that
handle student administration and command functions. They
require the ability to input information into the NSGD
student database
In addition to the internal access requirements, several of
the staff offices also require outside access to various agencies.
Specifically, outside E-mail and File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
access is required for the offices as follows:
• Database Manager and Professional Development: Access to
the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and the
Commander Naval Security Group (CNSG) is required.
• Quota Manager: Outside access is required with DLI, CNET,
Army NITRAS, and BUPERS.
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• Division Officer and Information Security Manager: Requires
outside access with DLI, CNET, and CNSG.
• Supply Officer: Outside access is required with DLI
logistics, DLI Information Management, the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS)
,
CNSG, Navy Comptroller, and
commercial vendors
.
• Command Career Counselor and Educational Services Officer:
Outside access is required with CNET, CNSG, and BUPERS
.




Thirty Intel 486DX2 -66 MHz Energy Star Systems provide
access to the LAN for the various LAN users. These systems include
14
-inch Video Graphics Array (VGA) monitors, 16 MBytes of Random




The LAN servers include one Pollywell Pentium 100 MHz
Redundant Arrays of Inexpensive Drives (RAID) System set to RAID
level 5 with mirroring, 12 GBytes of hard drive space, 65 MBytes of
RAM, a CD-ROM, and a tape backup. Two additional servers are
Pentium 100 MHz machines with 32 MBytes of RAM, 1 . 2 GB hard drives,
CD-ROM, and a tape backup. The 1.2 GB hard drives are MAXTOR
MXT-SCSI 1240S models with fast Small Computer System Interface- II
(SCSI- II) connections. The tape backup units are WANGTEX model
51000ES with a capacity of 1 . GBytes and they are SCSI compatible.
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The CD-ROM units are Phillips Sony CM 225MS models and are
multi- session capable.
c. Printers
Three Epson Action Laser 1000 printers with 2 MBytes of
memory each provide printing capability to LAN users. The printers
can be upgraded to a maximum of 6.5 MBytes of memory each using 256
KByte chips. The majority of the workstations in the staff offices




The Falcon LAN is an Ethernet 10Base2 network using Thin
Net RG-223 coaxial cabling and BNC connectors to provide internal
connectivity. Links within building 629A join the Learning Center
computers used by Navy students with office computers used by the
Navy staff. Building 616, the Navy's Administration building, uses
Thin Net cabling to connect a series of computers used by the
Commanding Officer (CO) , Executive Officer (XO) , and additional
Navy staff.
e. External Cabling
The Presidio of Monterey (POM) Facility Area Network
(FAN) provides the campus backbone for DLI and is managed by the
Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) . Major features of
the FAN include an IBM 3174 mainframe computer, a 48 -strand
multi -mode fiber optic backbone, and a CISCO AGS+ router to which
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six token ring 802.5 LANs are attached. The token ring upon which
the mainframe is resident provides a 56 Kbps telephone link to the
NIPRNET, the replacement for the Defense Data Network. The FAN was
used to provide the external connectivity between buildings 629A
and 616 as well as connectivity to the "outside world" through the
CISCO router.
DLI's fiber optic plant consists of a 48-strand
multi-mode backbone from building 343, the location of the Cisco
AGS+ router, to building 617, with connections to 92 buildings on
campus, including buildings 616 and 629A. An optical transceiver
completes the connection between buildings 616 and 629, and the
AGS+ Cisco router by performing the required ethernet-to-optical
conversions and vice versa.
3. Software
Within Building 629A, 30 PCs provide processing capability for
an estimated 400 students. Physically located in the student
Learning Center, these computers have WordPerfect 6.0 and language
software applications. Additional applications, learning programs
and electronic mail may be added to the network in the future.
Windows NT 3.51 is the Network Operating System (NOS) used on
the servers. In addition to Windows NT, the client workstations
use the Windows 95 operating system with the following applications
available to staff personnel: WordPerfect 6.0, MS Office
Professional with Bookshelf, Lotus 123, and Harvard Graphics. The
Structured Query Language (SQL) server provides access to SQL,
Paradox, NITRAS, ATRRS, and Harvard Graphics.
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C. CLASS C2 REQUIREMENT
The National Security Agency (NSA) has stipulated that all
computer systems operated by cryptologic organizations must achieve
the following minimum level of trust by calendar year 2000: [Ref
.
18]





According to the Information System and Network Security Procedures
for Service Cryptologic Elements [Ref. 18], the Falcon LAN is
categorized as a cryptologic Automated Information System (AIS)
since it directly supports the efforts of the cryptologists
assigned to DLI . Although the information stored on the Falcon
LAN will be unclassified, due to the sensitivity of Privacy Act
information it should be considered as operating in the System High
mode. This classification would be used since all system users will
have the appropriate clearance (in this case unclassified) , but
some will not have a valid "need-to-know" for some of the data
contained in the system. Therefore, the Falcon LAN would be
required to meet the Class C2 requirements by calendar year 2000.
D. WINDOWS NT VERSION 3.51 OVERVIEW
Windows NT Workstation and Windows NT Server are 32 -bit,
graphical oriented operating systems which support popular Windows
-
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based applications, preemptive multitasking, and symmetric
processing. [Ref . 19] "Windows NT Workstation is optimized to
provide a high level of interactive application responsiveness,
while Windows NT Server provides optimized network responsiveness."
[Ref. 20: p. 4] Specific workstation features which were optimized
(when compared to earlier versions of the software and other
network operating systems) include overall reduction of memory
usage, higher system priorities for interactive applications, and
improved efficiency of both 16 -bit and 32 -bit applications.
Similarly, the server features which were optimized include
improved memory usage (by caching large amounts of data) , higher
system priorities for network users, and improved efficiency for
32-bit server operations. Normally the name Windows NT is used to
reference both products.
Both Windows NT Server and Windows NT Workstation were tested
by the NCSC for Class C2 compliance with the requirements set forth
in the TCSEC . The hardware platforms used in the evaluation
included two different processor architectures: Intel Pentium
microprocessor (Compaq Proliant 2000 and 4000 (Pentium) ) and the
DEC Alpha AXP/150 with the DECchip 2106-AA processor. It is
important to note that the testing performed was for a stand-alone
configuration only. Therefore, Class C2 compliance in a networked
environment using Windows NT has not been granted. The Final
Evaluation Report [Ref. 21] of 14 February 1996, was written by the
NCSC evaluation team and provides a comprehensive summary of the
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results for the overall evaluation. It was the primary reference
used throughout this section.
Before evaluating Windows NT and the Falcon LAN against the
TCSEC, an overview of the Windows NT software is needed. The
following sections are provided to create a foundation for the
evaluation that is conducted in Section E of this chapter.
1. The Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
Three components make up the Windows NT Trusted Computing Base
(TCB) : [Ref . 21: p. 5]
• Executive: runs the processor privileged state or kernel
mode.
• Protected Servers: run the processor unprivileged state,
called user-mode.
• Administrator Tools: run in user mode.
Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of the overall TCB.
Due to space limitations, not every executive subsystem or
individual protected server has been drawn. However, the I/O
Subsystem and Memory Manager have been identified to show the
interaction with the hardware. In addition, it should be noted
that the device drivers, microkernel, memory manager, and Hardware
Abstraction Layer are all hardware dependent.
a. The Executive
The executive is further divided into three conceptual layers
which are referred to as the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) , the




The HAL "provides an abstract view of the underlying machine
architecture to the executive, allowing for a machine -independent
implementation of Windows NT executive (thereby allowing Windows NT
to be easily ported within machines of similar architectures."
[Ref . 21: p. 5] The information provided to the executive by the
HAL includes machine- specific details regarding functions such as






















Figure 3. Windows NT Operating System Overview [Ref. 21: p. 6]
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The Microkernel provides the foundation for the rest of the
executive subsystems, giving low-level support for execution,
interrupt and exception handling, and synchronization. Some of the
primitive objects created by the Microkernel are exported to user-
mode programs from the executive by the Executive Object Services
and Process Manager.
The executive subsystems include the following:
• Object Manager: The Object Manager is responsible for the
creation, access, and deletion of objects used within the
executive and exported from the executive. The Object
Manager is also responsible for managing handles and handle
tables. Every process has a handle table which identifies
the objects currently accessed by it. For a process to gain
access to an executive object, the process must first
acquire a handle (a ticket that permits access) from the
Object Manager. The Object Manager works with the Security
Reference Monitor to validate if the process is authorized
access, generates the handle (if permitted) , and then adds
the handle to the object's handle table. The handle
identifies the type of access allowed (i.e., read, write,
execute) and limits the type of access to only those
permitted. The Object Manager manages three types of
objects: type, directory, and symbolic link. The "type"
object is used only within the executive. It provides the
executive subsystems with the ability "to create classes of
objects (e.g., directories, files, processes, semaphores)
and define their semantics." [Ref. 21: p. 7]
• Security Reference Monitor: This subsystem generates the
checks for access control and privilege validation and is
also responsible for audit generation. The Security
Reference Monitor exports security services to user-mode
processes through the generation of tokens which are used by
the protected servers to validate access requests, check
authorized privileges, and generate audits for the user-
mode .
• Process Manager: "Windows NT executive provides multi-
threaded processes. Essentially, a process is a private
virtual address space, associated physical memory, and a set
of accessible objects. A thread is a point of execution
within a process, and includes all necessary execution
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context information (e.g., registers, stack pointers). A
process may have zero or more threads." [Ref . 21: p. 7] A
process with no threads cannot execute. The Process Manager
exports both processes and threads as executive objects.
• Virtual Memory Manager: This subsystem provides a demand-
paged memory management system for the executive. Every
process has a private page table directory which identifies
the location of various page tables. The page tables in
turn identify the location of pages of memory. Combined,
the page table directories and page tables are used to
identify memory locations. Page-level memory protection
features are included for read, write, and execute access.
Sections of shared memory between processes are exported by
the Virtual Memory Manager as an executive object type.
• Local Procedure Call (LPC) Facility: Communication between
processes is supported through the LPC Facility. It may
export executive object ports for communication support
outside of the executive.
• Input/Output (I/O) Subsystem: The I/O subsystem includes
the I/O Manager, the file systems, and the various device
drivers; and provides packet -driven, asynchronous I/O. Some
device drivers may have a layered structure, with each layer
depending upon the services of the lower layers. The I/O
Manager facilitates the communication between the layers.
The Cache Manager is used by the file system to support
memory-mapped I/O and provide a memory-based cache.
• Configuration Manager: The Configuration Manager maintains
the system configuration information through a registry.
The registry is implemented in a tree -structured database
that is indexed by keys. Keys are the executive type object
which may be exported by the Configuration Manager.
• Executive Object Services: The Executive Object Services
along with the Process Manager provide interfaces between
the user-mode and exported executive objects.
b. Protected Servers
Protected Servers are user-mode processes which provide
security relevant services. The Protected Servers which were
included in the Windows NT software evaluated by NCSC included:
the Local Security Authority (LSA) subsystem, WinLogon, Win32, the
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Security Accounts Manager (SAM) , the Print Spooler, the Session
Manager, the Service Controller, and the Event Logger. [Ref
. 21:
p. 8] The following provides a brief description of each protected
server
:
• Local Security Authority (LSA) : Maintains the list of valid
user identifiers and their associated passwords. It is also
used to collect and store audit records.
• WinLogon: Coordinates user authentication upon login by
prompting the user for an identifier and password. The
information is validated by the LSA before system access is
permitted.
• Win32 : Provides the interface to Windows NT through two
user-mode exported objects, WindowStation and DeskTop. The
WindowStation object provides the means for a user to access
and manipulate the various system resources, such as the
keyboard, mouse, and display. The DeskTop object provides
the user with abstract resources such as menus, windows, and
title bars. Every DeskTop object must have an associated
WindowStation object. Both types of objects are protected
and audited through the use of services provided by the
Security Reference Monitor.
• Security Accounts Manager (SAM) : Provides security
administration of user accounts.
• Print Spooler: Routes print requests to the appropriate
printer.
• Session Manager: Initiates the WinLogon and Win32 protected
servers during system initialization and starts other system
processes as needed. The Session Manager works with the
WinLogon and Service Controller to authenticate user access
and identify security attributes.
• Service Controller: Manages drivers and services by
monitoring the current status of each. Also ensures the
loading of all drivers which require automatic loading at
boot -time
.
• Event Logger: Writes audit records into a log file and
provides services for processes to enter events into the
log. Services are also provided for the log entries to be




Backup Provides functions to back up disk files to
tape, restore tape files to disk, label, track,
and identify tapes.
Chkdsk Checks for and identifies file integrity
problems; also examines security descriptor
information of NTFS partitions.
Control Panel Permits users to customize and administer
Windows NT; security relevant features include
the administration of the computer clock,
device drivers, ports, print manager, Registry
services, and system performance parameters.
Disk
Administrator
Provides functions to partition disks, create
and delete volume sets, extend volume sets,
create and delete stripe sets, establish and
break mirror sets, and recover data.
Event Viewer Allows for viewing, sorting, filtering, and
searching event logs
.
File Manager Provides file and directory manipulation and
organization functions.
Print Manager Provides functions to manage printing,
printers, and print jobs.
Program
Manager
Basic user interface used to organize the




Used to view and edit the configuration
database.
Setup Used to accomplish the original installation of
Windows NT; allows administrators to make
several configuration changes.
User Manager Used to create and manage user accounts and
groups, and to implement the security policy.
Table 4. Administrator Tools [Ref . 21: pp. 128 - 131]
The Administrator Tools provide resources for managing all
aspects of the Windows NT System. Included are tools for managing
user accounts, auditing the system configuration, performing file
system backups, and reviewing audit records. The specific set of
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tools which were included in the NCSC evaluation were: "Backup,
Chkdsk, Control Panel, Disk Administrator, Event Viewer, File
Manager, Print Manager, Program Manager, Registry Editor, Setup,
and User Manager." [Ref. 21: p. 9] Table 4 provides a brief
description of each of these tools.
d. TCB Interfaces
There are three methods through which an untrusted subject may-
request services from the TCB:
• Unprivileged Hardware Instructions: The untrusted subject
may invoke any unprivileged hardware instruction (e.g.,
arithmetic operations)
.
• Windows NT Executive System Services: The untrusted subject
may make a call to the executive system services.
• Interprocess Communication (IPC) : The untrusted subject may
make a request of one of the protected servers
.
A large set of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) provide the
programming interface to the Windows NT system. When a function is
initiated by one of the DLLs, it will result in at least one of the
above service requests.
2. Subjects
In Windows NT, a subject is a process with one or more
threads. Each process has an associated virtual address space, a
private handle table, and a security context. Every thread within
the process has equal access to the address space and private
handle table. Security context information is provided by access
tokens which contain access control and privilege information.
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Every process has exactly one primary token which represents the
current user and his or her authorized access permissions.
Windows NT also permits a technique referred to as
impersonation in which one process may adopt the security
attributes of another process. For example, this may occur when a
server process impersonates a client process in order to obtain
access to objects maintained on the client. Each thread within a
process may have one impersonation token which is used to
accomplish this task.
3. Objects
Two broad categories of objects are used by Windows NT:
executive objects and server objects. The executive objects are
created, managed, and protected by the various executive subsystems
and the server objects are created and maintained by the user-mode
protected servers. The Object Manager and Security Reference
Monitor provide access mediation for all executive objects. In
contrast, server objects are protected by the corresponding TCB
protected server which may request services from the Security
Reference Monitor in the executive. Table 5 provides a breakdown
of the various types of objects and the corresponding subsystem
which is responsible for the object's security and management.
73
Executive Object Types
Object Type Managing Subsystem
Event Executive Object Services
Event Pair Executive Object Services
I/O Completion Port Executive Object Services
Key Configuration Manager
Mutext Executive Object Services
Object Directory Object Manager
Object Symbolic Links Object Manager
Port Local Procedure Call Facility
Process Process Manager
Profile Executive Object Services
Section Memory Manager
Semaphore Executive Object Services
Thread Process Manager
Timer Executive Object Services
Tokens Security Reference Monitor
Device I/O Manager and Device Drivers
Mailslot Mailslot File System
Named Pipe Named Pipe File System
NTFS File Windows NT File System
NTFS Directory Windows NT File System
Protected Server Obj ect Types (user accessible)




Print Job Print Spooler
Printer Print Spooler
Print Server Print Spooler
Windowstation Win32 Server
Table 5. Windows NT Protected Objects [Ref . 21: p. 141]
Every object may have one or more of the following attributes
associated with it:
Owner ID: Identifies the owner of the object. The owner
may be an individual, a global group, or a local group. The
owner always has the WriteDAC and ReadControl permissions
for the object. WriteDAC allows the DACL to be modified and
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ReadControl allows an object's security information to be
read.
• Discretionary Access Control List (DACL) : The DACL provides
the primary means for controlling access to an object. The
DACL entry identifies the permissions granted or explicitly
denied to a user or group of users
.
• System Access Control List (SACL) : A system administrative
structure, the SACL is used to control security auditing for
the object.
• Group ID: Used to provide compatibility with certain
operating system standards, such as POSIX. It has no
security relevance.
Container and non- container are two additional terms which are
used to define objects within Windows NT. Specifically, a
container object is one which logically contains other objects.
For example, a directory would be defined as a container object
since it contains files. In turn, the files are examples of non-
container objects since they do not contain other objects. [Ref.
22]
4. Object Access Rights
An access mask is the DACL entry used to denote the types of
access permitted or denied to an object. A standard structure is
used for all types of objects to ensure the "Security Reference
Monitor (SRM) can perform access validation regardless of the
specific object type." [Ref. 21: p. 142] Although the access mask
structure is standard, the meaning of some fields within the mask
may be type specific and are defined by the executive subsystem or
protected server responsible for managing the object.
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Five types of access rights may be specified by an access
mask: standard, specific, generic, Maximum Allowed (MA) , and
Access system Security (AS)
. MA and AS rights are used only with
requests for access to an object. Specifically, MA is used to
request all permitted access rights to the object and AS is used to
request access to the object's SACL.
The standard access rights are interpreted the same for all
objects, regardless of type, and include five permissions: [Ref
.
21: p. 143]
• Delete: Permits an object to be deleted.
• ReadControl: Permits an object's security related
information (e.g., owner, DACL) to be read.
• WriteDAC: Permits modification of the DACL.
• WriteOwner: Permits a thread to change the ownership of an
object to any security identifier within the thread's
current token
.
• Synchronize: Permits the object to be used for process
synchronization
.
The synchronize permission is normally used only for specific types
of objects such as communication or process objects. The other
four permissions are used for all types of objects.
Specific access rights are completely type-specific and have
no general meaning. The access mask may contain up to 16
permissions which are defined by the responsible executive
subsystem or protected server.
Finally, generic access rights are not actually access rights




The reference is a mapping to a subset of the other
rights. There are four generic access rights: GenericRead,
GenericWrite, GenericExecute, and GenericAll . GenericAll is
structured to map to all of the standard and specific rights of the
specified object type.
5 . Privileges
"Privileges are stored in a process' token and allow a thread
to take exception to an object's DACL or utilize restricted
services." [Ref . 21: p. 151] The privileges of a process are
determined by the privileges assigned to the account of the user
who has invoked the process. A privilege may be used by a thread
at any time. The subsystem which implements and audits the
privilege is referred to as the enforcer. Examples of privileges
are
:
• CreateToken: Creates a token; enforced by the SRM.
• AssignPrimaryToken: Assigns the primary token of a process;
enforced by the Process Manager.
• Security: Identifies the holder as a security operator,
permitting access to SACLs and the audit log; enforced by
Win32, Object Manager, SRM, NTFS, Event Logger.
• LockMemory: Locks physical pages in memory; enforced by the
Memory Manager.
• Backup: Needed to perform backup operations; enforced by
the Configuration Manager, I/O subsystem, and NTFS.
• SystemTime: Permits the system time to be changed; enforced
by the Executive Object Services.
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6. File System Types
Windows NT supports five distinct types of file systems
including the File Allocation Table (FAT) system, the Windows NT
File System (NTFS) , the CD-ROM File System (CDFS) , the Named Pipe
File System (NPFS) , and the Mailslot File System. NTFS is a new
file system which was specifically designed for Windows NT. It is
not supported on floppy diskettes and only NTFS files are protected
by Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
.
Any environment with security concerns should use the NTFS
file system because it provides more security features than the
standard FAT system. If a FAT system is used, the Secure System
Partition command from the Disk Administrator utility may be used
to partition the FAT in its entirety.
7. C2Config.EXE
To assist with establishing a Class C2 compliant system, an
application called C2Conf ig was created and included in the Windows
NT Resource Kit [Ref . 23] . The program allows the user to select
and implement the appropriate settings for Class C2 security. A
graphical display with a lock next to each security aspect
indicates which requirements have been satisfied (locked) and which
requirements have not been met (unlocked) . In addition to the
indication of being locked or open, a color scheme is used to
denote which requirements are mandatory for Class C2 compliance.
Specifically, a red lock indicates an explicit requirement and a
blue lock represents an optional feature. The various attributes
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and their descriptions as defined on screen by the Windows NT
Resource Kit are: [Ref . 23]
• File Systems (Required) : Under Windows NT, only the NT File
System (NTFS) supports DAC to the files and directories.
Consequently, only NTFS volumes are allowed on the system to
provide secure and auditable access to the files. FAT
volumes do not provide the necessary security functions to
support Class C2 level security.
• OS Configuration (Required) : Allowing other operating
systems, such as MS-DOS to run on a secure system, can allow
users to circumvent Windows NT security. For a system to
support Class C2 level security, Windows NT must be the only
operating system on the computer.
• OS/2 Subsystem (Required) : The OS/2 subsystem was not
included in the current NCSC Class C2 evaluated
configuration. For a system to conform to the evaluated
configuration, the OS/2 system must be disabled. The
C2Configuration manager disables the OS/2 subsystem by
deleting the following files from the SYSTEM32 directory
under the systemroot: 0S2.EXE and 0S2SS.EXE.
• POSIX Subsystem (Required) : The POSIX subsystem was not
included in the current NCSC Class C2 evaluated
configuration. For a system to conform to the evaluated
configuration, the POSIX system must be disabled. The
C2Configuration manager disables the POSIX subsystem by
deleting the following files from the SYSTEM32 directory
under the systemroot: PSXSS.EXE.
• Security Log (Required) : Class C2 level security requires
that a security audit log be maintained and the events in
the log may not be automatically overwritten. For systems
that do not require Class C2 level security, other logging
options may be selected such as to overwrite events that are
older than a certain age or when the log is full
.
• Halt on Audit Failure (Optional) : If the security log is
full, it becomes possible for some events to not be logged.
Selecting this option will halt the computer when the log is
full to prevent losing any events. If the system halts as
a result of a full log, an administrator must restart the
system and reset the log.
• Display Logon Message (Optional) : On a secured system, a
warning message may be displayed before the user is allowed
to log on. Typically this message will inform the user that
the system is authorized for users only and that
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unauthorized use is considered trespass or is unwelcomed.
In contrast, if the system is used in a public forum, the
message may be used to inform the user of current events or
how to log onto the system.
• Last Username Display (Optional) : Displaying the name of
the last user can make logging in more convenient, however,
hiding the name of the last user can prevent usernames from
being accidentally discovered and subsequently used to break
into the system. This option allows the username to be
hidden when the logon screen is displayed.
• Shutdown Button (Optional) : Hiding the shutdown button from
the logon screen prevents users from shutting the system
down without first logging onto the computer. This option
should only be selected if the power switch and reset button
is not accessible by the user. Even though the shutdown
button may be hidden, if the user has access to either the
reset button or the power switch, they may still turn the
system off without properly shutting down the operating
system.
• Password Length (Required) : The longer the password, the
less likely it will be discovered randomly, or deliberately
by an intruder. Class C2 level security does not allow
Blank Passwords. Using this item, the desired password
policy can be selected.
• Guest Account (Required) : The Guest account allows
anonymous and therefore unauditable access to the system and
its files. Class C2 level security does not allow for
anonymous access to the system and therefore requires the
Guest account to be disabled or deleted from the system.
When this item is selected, the Class C2 Configuration
manager disables all Guest accounts.
• Networking (Required) : Not currently cleared for networks
.
• Drive Letters and Printers (Optional) : To prevent
redirection of data to a device or port that may not be
authorized, the assignment of drive letters and printer
ports can be restricted to administrators only.
• Removable Media Drives (Optional) : Since Windows NT is a
multi-user system, programs run by other users may be
running in the background while a user is logged on. It is
possible to prevent programs run by other users from
accessing disks in removable media drives that may have been
inserted while a user is logged on by allocating these
drives automatically when a user logs on.
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E. EVALUATING THE LEVEL OF TRUST
Since the computer system implemented at DLI is a network, the
TCSEC criterion as interpreted in the TNI must be used to determine
if the system meets the Class C2 requirements. The following
sections provide a breakdown of these criterion with an evaluation
of the Falcon network. Since the Network Operating System (NOS) is
the primary controller of access to the various objects (including
applications) on the network, the focus of this evaluation is on
Windows NT version 3.51.
1. Security Policy
The first requirement of the TCSEC specifically states that a
system must have an "explicit and well-defined security policy
enforced by the system." [Ref . 5: p. 3] This means that with the
set of all identified subjects and objects within the system, there
must exist a set of rules which are used by the system to determine
whether or not a subject should be permitted access to an object.
At the Class C2 level of trust, this policy will be discretionary
and will be enforced using the Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
and Object Reuse requirements, at a minimum. The information will
be protected to the granularity of individual access rights. In
addition, the policy implementation will describe network features
which prevent or detect the unauthorized reading or destruction of
sensitive information.
It should be noted that the TNI does not include operators,
system programmers, technical control officers, and system security
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officers under the title of users. These positions are considered
support personnel and are subject to the requirements of the
Trusted Facility Manual and the System Architecture. [Ref . 15: p.
16]
The network security policy may require data secrecy, data
integrity, or both. The secrecy policy defines the DAC mechanisms
used to prevent the unauthorized reading of sensitive information,
and the data integrity policy defines the mechanisms used to
prevent the unauthorized modification (i.e., writing) of sensitive
information. Due to the amount of sharing in a networked
environment, the integrity of the data stored is just as important
as the secrecy of the data. Therefore, most networks will address
both data secrecy and data integrity in the overall security
policy.
a. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
Requirement: The DAC portion of the security policy must
define and control the access of objects by subjects within the
system to the individual user level. Groups of individuals may
also be given control rights, provided the individual members of
the groups are identified by the group name. This includes network
identifiers such as internet addresses for various components of
the network. In addition, the DAC mechanism must limit the
propagation of access rights with only authorized subjects being




Windows NT Features: Windows NT uses Discretionary Access
Control Lists (DACLs) to regulate access between subjects and
objects with access controlled to the granularity of an individual
user. The entries are used only with the NTFS file system. Each
entry represents access granted or explicitly denied to a user or
group of users. The DACL also permits users to share objects with
other users or groups of users. The owner of an object or any user
with WriteDAC access to the object, may define access restrictions
on the object. NT does not require every object to have a DACL
associated with it. If an object does not have a DACL, then any
user who is able to name and open the object is permitted all
access rights. This is not the same, however, as an empty DACL
which means no one has access to the object.
The DAC policy is enforced by the Security Reference Monitor
(SRM) . When access to an object is requested by a subject, the SRM
compares the subject's token to the object's DACL. If the subject
is requesting access to an executive object, the request must be
made through the Object Manager which in turn performs the
validation with the SRM. Once it has been determined that access
is permitted, a handle is created and access is granted (see
section D.l.a, Object Manager description) . After a handle has been
stored for a subject in the executive object's handle table, all
subsequent access requests are verified by using the access mask
that is stored as part of the handle.
If the subject is requesting access to a protected server
object, the object must be opened before access is permitted. Once
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the request is made by the subject, the protected server sends a
validation request to the SRM to verify that access is authorized.
If access is permitted, the SRM exports a handle with the
appropriate information and the object is opened (i.e., access is
granted)
.
Unlike the executive objects, this process must be
accomplished for all subsequent requests by the subject as well.
There are six privileges which may override the rights listed
in the DACL. If any of these privileges are enabled on the primary
or impersonation token of the subject requesting access, the DACL
is overridden. The exception privileges include TakeOwnership,
Security, Backup, Restore, Debug, and ChangeNotify
.
When an object is created, the DACL may be directly assigned,
assigned by default, or inherited. If directly assigned, the
parameters which define the DACL are passed by the object create
system call. The default assignment is used for objects which are
required to have a DACL. This includes all named executive
objects, server objects, process, thread, and token objects. When
the object is created, the values assigned to the DACL are based
upon the user creating the object, any explicit values provided in
the create process, default values from the creating process token,
and any inheritable DACL information. Finally, sub-objects of
container objects may inherit DACL information from the container
or parent object. Control flags which are part of the DACL entry
may be used to limit the amount of inheritance permitted.
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Jb. Object Reuse
Requirement: Object reuse pertains specifically to the
storage objects within a computer system and is used to ensure the
secrecy of information once a portion of memory or storage space
has been reallocated. Specifically, the TNI states:
All authorizations to the information contained within a
storage object shall be revoked prior to initial
assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject from
the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No
information, including encrypted representations of
information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an
object that has been released back to the system. [Ref
.
15: p. 20]
As applied to a networked environment, the object reuse criterion
requires the NTCB to ensure a storage object does not contain
information for which the subject is not authorized access before
granting the subject access rights. This requirement must be
enforced by every portion of the network that contains storage
objects
.
Windows NT Features : "All resources, including executive and
non-executive objects, visible at the TCB interface are
appropriately handled with respect to object reuse." [Ref. 21: p.
180] The object reuse requirements are fulfilled by the executive
or non-executive subsystem which is responsible for creating and
maintaining the object. Reuse protection is provided in three
ways: [Ref. 21: p. 153]
• All fields in the object's header and body are initialized
to new values as appropriate
.
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• The memory allocated for an object is written over with
zeros
.
• Only the data that has been written most recently may be
read and nothing more
.
For objects such as files which may require frequent changes,
access controls in addition to the DACL are provided by the use of
high water marks and end-of-file markers. The high water mark
indicates the largest size of the file prior to current access.
When a new process accesses the file, the subject may enlarge the
file, moving the end-of-file marker. When this occurs, the file
system immediately zeros the space on the disk or tape between the
old high water mark and the new end-of-file marker, thus
prohibiting any process from reading beyond the previous end-of-
file marker. [Ref . 21] The same process is used for any object
which requires frequent backups to disk in order to minimize the
amount of dynamic memory required.
Hardware reuse is controlled by the executive subsystems,
WinLogon, or Win32 and includes the use of integer and floating
point registers, VGA memory, and special purpose registers. The
reuse requirements are met by clearing all storage locations when
one interactive user logs out of the system or upon reallocation of
the storage. Specifically:
• Processor registers are initialized to a known state when a
thread is started. When the context changes, the processor
state is saved and all registers (except floating point) are
reinitialized. Floating point registers are saved and




• VGA memory is cleared and can no longer be displayed when an
interactive user logs off
.
• I/O hardware (e.g., drive controller status registers,
keyboard buffers, and data caches) require administrative or
system privileges to access. Any attempt to access these
objects by an unauthorized subject will result in a general
exception and access is denied.
• Printer buffers are cleared by printer language code which
is sent to the printer prior to each print job.
2. Accountability
a. Identification and Authentication
Requirement: All users must identify themselves to the TCB
before it can be expected to mediate any actions on their behalf.
A protected mechanism such as a password must be used to
authenticate the user's identity, and all authentication data must
be protected from unauthorized disclosure. The TCB must be able to
enforce accountability with the granularity of an individual user
through unique identification of all users and auditing of user
actions
.
In a networked environment, the identification and
authentication may be performed by either the individual component
to which the user is connected or some other component
.
Authentication information may be passed between components of the
network (NTCB partitions) without reauthentication, provided the
data is protected from unauthorized disclosure or modification.
Most networked environments use a network interface card (e.g.,
Ethernet card) in the computer systems for authentication.
Windows NT Features: To logon to the system, Windows NT
requires every user to be identified with a unique username . The
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username is represented internally by a Security Identifier (SID)
which cannot be reassigned to another user. When the user
initiates a process, his or her SID is incorporated in the process'
primary token and is used for auditing of all security related
events
.
Windows NT permits passwords to be used in conjunction with
the username. The passwords are encrypted and stored in the
Security Accounts Manager (SAM) . When a user logs onto the system,
the Local Security Authority (LSA) checks with the SAM to ensure
the username and password provided are authentic before granting
the user access to the system.
There are some serious concerns with respect to identification
and authentication in a networked Windows NT environment. First,
the Windows NT configuration evaluated by the NCSC did not use a
secure network interface card to ensure authentication. Second, a
remote utility permits administrators to manage all network users
from anywhere on the network provided the appropriate trust
relationships have been established between users and groups of
users. Should the administrator's logon identification and
password be compromised, the remote utility could be used by a
"masquerader" with full access to the network through the remote
utility. In general, Windows NT server does not provide any
protection against intruders beyond the password.
88
b. Audit
Requirement : An audit trail of access to objects protected by
the TCB must be provided. The specific auditing requirements
outlined in the TCSEC are:
The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect
from modification or unauthorized access or destruction
an audit trail of accesses to the objects it protects.
The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read
access to it is limited to those who are authorized for
audit data. The TCB shall be able to record the
following types of events: use of identification and
authentication mechanisms, introduction of objects,
actions taken by computer operators and system
administrators and/or system security officers, and other
security relevant events. For each recorded event, the
audit record shall identify: date and time of the event,
user, type of event, and success or failure of the event.
For identification/authentication events the origin of
request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the
audit record. For events that introduce an object into
a user's address space and for object deletion events the
audit record shall include the name of the object. The
system administrator shall be able to selectively audit
the actions of any one or more users based on individual
identity. [Ref . 15: p. 22]
In the networked environment, the auditing capabilities may be
provided by one or more components with data transmitted to a
designated collection point. Auditing capabilities are to be
provided for both local and remote access; and provisions must be
made to protect the data from loss due to resource inavailability
.
Windows NT Features: The Local Security Authority (LSA)
,
Security Reference Monitor (SRM)
,
protected servers and executive
subsystems, Event Logger, and Event Viewer combine to provide the
auditing mechanism for Windows NT. The LSA defines which events
are to be audited and passes the appropriate parameters (i.e.,
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auditing enabled flag and event categories) to the SRM. "The event
categories are: detailed tracking, system, logon/logoff, object
access, privilege use, policy changes, and account management."
[Ref
.
21: p. 159] The event types included in each event category
are listed in Table 6 along with the subsystem which is responsible
for generating the audit record.
Audit records for the detailed tracking, system, object
access, and privilege categories are constructed by the SRM. In
order for an audit record to be generated, the responsible
subsystem or protected server must send a request to the SRM that
an audit record be made for each occurrence of the specified event.
Any executive subsystem can initiate such a request, but user-mode
protected servers must have the Audit privilege before making the
request. The Audit privilege is identified in the primary token of
the process initiating the request.
The actual audit records are written to a log file by the
Event Logger. In turn, the system administrator may read the
security log or generate a report by using the Event Viewer. A
user must have either the Security privilege or be granted access
to the security log through its DACL in order to use the Event
Viewer to view the file. Read and write permission provided by the
DACL is limited to members of the Administrative group only, and
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Category Event Type Constructor
System System Restart SRM
System Shutdown SRM
Authentication Package Loaded LSA
Registered Logon Process LSA
AuditLog Cleared SRM






Unknown User or Password LSA














Assign Special Privilege SRM
Privileged Service SRM











Audit Policy Change LSA
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Global Group Member Removed LSA
Global Group Member Added LSA
Local Group Changed LSA
Local Group Created LSA
Local Group Member Removed LSA
Local Group Member Added LSA
Local Group Deleted LSA
Table 6. Audit Event Types [Ref . 21: p. 160]
the Security privilege is only assigned to administrators. Each
audit record contains the following information:
• Time event was generated
• SID of the process generating the event
• Name of component or module submitting the event
• Event ID
• Type of event: error, warning, success, information,




Figure 4 details the flow and interaction of the auditing scheme





















Figure 4. Windows NT Audit Flow [Ref . 21: p. 158]
There are three situations which may cause audit records to be
lost
:
• The SRM internal queues reach their high water mark.
• The security log file becomes full
.
• The LSA internal queues become full.
The system can be configured to prevent a loss of records in these
instances. Specifically, the wrap around option for the security
log should not be selected, and the security log should be the
maximum size available with a registry key flagging the system to
halt when the file becomes full. These options are set by the
administrator using the Event Viewer.
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Despite the security features of Window NT, there is one
vulnerability which can permit the features to be bypassed. This
was demonstrated in the spring of 1995 and reported in Government
Computer News in September. Specifically, the article by Paul
Constance sites:
According to DOD security criterion, a Class C2 rating is
supposed to guarantee that an operating system can
prevent unauthorized access to specific files on a
computer and generate an unerasable audit trail of
attempts to gain access . But at the Armed Forces
Communications and Electronic Association's TechNet
conference in Washington this spring, dozens of attendees
watched as Robert Wainright, a Camden, N.J., computer
security consultant, used commercial utilities to read,
copy and delete protected data on the hard drive of a PC
running Microsoft Windows NT - all without leaving a
trace
.
Wainright exploited the so-called "boot floppy"
vulnerability of PCs with Intel Corp. microprocessors and
floppy disk drives. By interrupting a normal boot-up from
the hard drive, a user can invoke the system setup
routines and boot from the floppy. Using assembly
language utilities, an intruder then can read, copy or
delete files from the hard drive, all without invoking
the OS and its security features. [Ref . 24]
The reason this vulnerability was not a factor in the evaluation
conducted by the NCSC was due to the "fact that the two Proliant
computers from Compaq Computer Corporation on which Windows NT was
evaluated had floppy drives that were disabled." [Ref. 24]
Typically, NSA will refer vulnerabilities such as this to the area
of "physical security" which includes measures such as removing the
floppy drive every night or installing a Fortezza encryption card
to increase the difficultly for an intruder attempting to boot from
the floppy. Ultimately, the responsibility for ensuring this
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vulnerability is not taken advantage of lies with the system
administrator who oversees the level of access granted to system
users. In a networked environment, the importance of this
vulnerability is drastically intensified with the network points of
access distributed throughout buildings and across campus and
should not be ignored.
3 . Assurance
a. Operational Assurance
Requirement: The System Architecture shall be designed to
protect the TCB from external interference or tampering. Protected
resources (e.g., subjects and objects) shall be isolated in a
manner which enforces access control and auditing requirements. In
a networked environment which partitions the NTCB, each partition
will provide protection over the resources within its domain.
System integrity is achieved through hardware and software
features which may be periodically used to ensure the correct
operation of the hardware and firmware elements of the TCB.
Features must also be available for validating the correct
operation of a new component before it is added to the network
configuration. If a failure is detected, it must be reported to
the network administrator for further investigation.
Windows NT Features : Several execution domains within the TCB
are used to provide protection from external interference and
tampering. The executive is protected by running in the hardware
kernel -mode (i.e., privileged mode), and the protected servers and
Administrator tools are all executed through a TCB process. The
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TCB processes are "protected through the address space isolation
mechanisms of the executive." [Ref . 21: p. 183] Finally, on-disk
storage and data structures are protected through the use of the
DACL mechanism. Through these features and the audit and control
mechanisms, Windows NT protects all system resources.
For the system integrity requirements, Microsoft has several
packages which may be requested for system testing and hardware
validation on various platforms. For example, a processor
diagnostic kit is available for Pentium processors as well as
hardware compatibility test suite for the system and peripherals.
In addition, most computer manufacturers can provide a suite of
diagnostic tests which demonstrate that the hardware is performing
properly. These diagnostics should be run prior to loading Windows
NT on the computer and revised periodically throughout the life of
the system to ensure the hardware is performing correctly.
Jb. Life-Cycle Assurance
Requirement : Security testing must be performed to ensure the
security mechanisms act in the manner described in the system
documentation. In particular, testing should focus on the
potential for an unauthorized user to bypass or defeat a security
mechanism and search for flaws which would permit unauthorized
access to audit or authentication data.
Windows NT Features: The testing performed by Microsoft on
Windows NT treated each component as a separate "black box" and
focused on three distinct aspects: [Ref. 21]
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• Testing the security- relevant functionality of the protected
servers, the executive, and the various Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs)
.
• Testing major security- relevant mechanisms including object
access protection, object reuse, and the use of privileges.
• Testing all security-relevant access to the TCB from the
administrative tools user interface.
Both automatic and manual tests were conducted on both Windows NT
Server and NT Workstation. "In general, the security-relevant APIs
of the protected servers and the executive were tested
automatically by programs that exercised numerous calls to the
APIs, each with different arguments or different test
configurations." [Ref . 21: p. 169]
4 . Documentation
a. Security Features User's Guide
Requirement : The manufacturer must provide user documentation
which describes the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
interprets their use, and describes how the subsystems or
components interact with one another.
Windows NT Features : The Windows NT Security Features Users
Guide (SFUG) provides the following information:
• Description of the Windows NT TCB and its protection
mechanisms
.
• "How to" information concerning logging onto Windows NT,
changing user's passwords, locking and unlocking the
computer, and using a screen saver.
• Explains how to place a DACL on a file or directory and
describes what ownership means
.
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b. Trusted Facility Manual
Requirement: This manual is addressed to the system
administrator and identifies functions and privileges which should
be controlled. Information concerning the review and maintenance
of audit files in particular, is addressed. In addition,
procedures for assisting with configuration management (including
physical and administrative controls) must be provided.
Windows NT Features : The Windows NT Trusted Facility Manual
fulfills these requirements by describing "privileged built-in
groups whose membership should be controlled" and identifying the
privileges and special abilities they provide. [Ref . 21: p. 185]
Auditing capabilities are also described in detail and the record
structure for every type of audit event is provided. Finally, the
various administrative tools are presented and discussed.
c. Test Documentation
Requirement: This documents the overall testing process by
identifying the test plan, describing procedures for testing
security mechanisms, and furnishing the results of functional
testing.
Windows NT Features : Following the security testing conducted
by Microsoft, the appropriate test documentation was created and
supplied to the NCSC during the product evaluation. The
documentation described the tests conducted, the security
mechanisms, and the administrative tools. In addition, an overview
document was provided which detailed the purpose and goal of each
test suite. Overall, the test documentation supplied to the NCSC
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was determined to be sufficient "with respect to both breadth and
depth of coverage." [Ref . 21: p. 185]
d. Design Documentation
Requirement: The design documentation describes the
manufacturer's security philosophy and explains how it is
translated into the TCB. When the TCB consist of distinct modules,
the interfaces between the modules are also described. For a
network environment with a partitioned NTCB, the security policy
and partitioning of the NTCB are described as well as the
allocation of security requirements among components. All relevant
components and their method of interconnection must be documented
and evaluated in order for the security of the entire network to be
validated. The Network Security Architecture and Design is the
document which normally details the specifics concerning the
interface between components of the network.
Windows NT Features: There are numerous documents and texts
available covering almost every aspect of Windows NT. Overall, the
system is very well documented. Both the Windows NT 3 . 5 Guidelines
for Security, Audit, and Control and the Windows NT Resource Kit
provide great detail with respect to security features and
mechanisms. However, despite a thorough review by the NCSC of the
documentation provided on Windows NT, a review of the Network
Security Architecture and Design was not conducted. Therefore,
assurance regarding the network design has not been provided by
NCSC.
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5. Additional TCSEC Features
In addition to the Class C2 level requirements, Windows NT
also met two B2 level requirements in the testing conducted by the
NCSC. Specifically, the NT platform was evaluated against the B2
Trusted Facility Management and B2 Trusted Path functional
requirements
.
For the B2 Trusted Facility Management requirement, the TCB
must separate operator and administrator functions . This was met
by the software's ability to grant an arbitrary subset of rights to
a user, enabling the role of "operator" to be defined according to
local requirements. "In addition, built-in groups, like Backup
Operator and Power Users allow users to perform well-defined roles
without providing the full range of capabilities associated with
administrator accounts." [Ref . 21: p. 187] This follows the
popular principle of "least privilege" which was introduced by
Jerome Saltzer and Michael Schroeder in their paper "The Protection
of Information in Computer Systems." [Ref. 25]
For the B2 Trusted Path requirement, a trusted communication
path between the TCB and the user must be supported for initial
logon and authentication, with communication initiated strictly by
the user. Windows NT provides a trusted path and uses the Secure
Attention Sequence (Ctrl, Alt, Del keys pressed simultaneously) to
initiate the logon and authentication process by the user. In
turn, this sequence guarantees the communication will be with the
WinLogon server and not another process. Therefore, control
through the trusted path is provided for the user to logon, logoff,
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shutdown the system, lock the workstation, or change their
password.
Although Windows NT meets the B2 level requirements for the
Trusted Facility Management and Trusted Path, it was not evaluated
against any assurance requirements above the Class C2 level.
Therefore, the overall evaluation rating remained at Class C2
.
6 . Other Security Services
Part II of the TNI describes the other security services which
are relevant to a networked environment. The following sections
provide an individual analysis of the Falcon LAN as compared to
each of these services. As discussed in chapter 5, each service is
rated according to its functionality, strength of mechanism, and
assurance. The ratings assigned to the Falcon LAN for each service
are based upon the research conducted in support of this thesis.
The following sections describe the functionality and strength
of mechanism requirements for each service and applies these
requirements to the Falcon LAN. The assurance provided for each
mechanism is concerned with the level of confidence the service
provides in meeting any threat to the mechanism. This is
determined by ensuring the mechanism has been implemented correctly
and the objectives of the service have been achieved. The
assurance for every service is evaluated with a rating in the range
of none to good.
a. Communications Integrity
Communications integrity refers to several security services
which are concerned with the "accuracy, faithfulness, non-
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corruptibility, and believability" of information that is
transferred between components of a computer or communications
network. [Ref
.
15: p. 178] The measures used to achieve
communications integrity have some strong similarities to the
mechanisms used to enforce DAC and MAC requirements. In the
networked environment, the communications integrity concerns are
defined through three aspects: authentication, communications
field integrity, and non- repudiation.
(1) Authentication. The functionality criterion
for authentication requires the network to ensure all exchanges of
data are established with the addressed component and not with
someone attempting to masquerade as another user or replay a
previous transmission. Authentication typically follows
identification and the system must protect all identification,
authentication, and authorization information. Techniques
routinely applied to networks to achieve authentication include:
passwords, encryption, and mechanisms which use the characteristics
and/or possession of the network component or user.
Encipherment or signature mechanisms may be used to
provide the authentication service through encryption. With a
conventional private -key encryption system, the encryption of a
message with a private key automatically implies the authenticity
of the data's origin since only the key's holder could have
produced the encrypted message. In cases where dishonesty may lead
to a dispute over the transmission of an encrypted message, a
digital signature scheme may be required for authentication. If a
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public-key encryption scheme is used, an encrypted message is
authenticated by decrypting it with the public key of the sender,
thus providing proof of its origin. The functionality of the
authentication service provided in the network is evaluated as none
or present, according to the presence or absence of the service.
The strength of the authentication service or
mechanism is typically evaluated in the range of none to good. If
the service provided is through the use of passwords, the strength
of the mechanism is dependent upon the manner in which passwords
are selected and protected. Parameters such as the length of the
password, its composition, the lifetime permitted, and the
protection afforded to passwords must be considered. For a
password mechanism to receive an evaluation of good, it must
conform to the Department of Defense Password Management Guidance
[Ref. 26], of 12 April 1985.
If the authentication service is provided through
encryption, the mechanism may be combined with handshaking
protocols or non- repudiation services (e.g., notarization scheme)
to strengthen the service. The overall strength of the service is
determined by evaluating the strength of the ciphers, the
correctness of protocol logic, and the implementation.
The Falcon LAN uses passwords and the Windows NT TCB
to identify and authenticate a user prior to granting access to the
system. With Windows NT, a unique Security Identifier (SID) is
used to identify every authorized user. The SID is actually
several concatenated numerical values which are hierarchical in
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nature and of variable length. The SAM stores the username,
corresponding SID, and encrypted password in a Registry which is
protected by a DACL. The actual authentication procedure with
respect to password management was described in the NCSC Final
Evaluation Report as follows:
Of particular interest is the storage of account
passwords. The User Manager uses a one-way function to
hash the password and then temporarily encrypts the
hashed password, using a trivial session key, for
transmission to the SAM. When the SAM receives the
password, it decrypts it, again using the trivial session
key, and re-encrypts it using a private key for storage
in the user's account in the security accounts database.
The private key that the SAM uses is based on the
account's user SID.
The main role of the SAM during the authentication
process is to provide requested information to the LSA
and the authentication package. Again, of particular
interest is the user's password. When the password is
requested from the SAM, the SAM first decrypts the
password, using its private key, and returns the hashed
value. Thus, the authentication package is comparing two
hashed values, rather than clear text or encrypted
values. [Ref. 21: pp. 113 and 115]
Windows NT provides the system administrator with
much flexibility for the management of passwords. Specifically,
the administrator can invoke the following constraints for each
system user:
• Set the minimum password length
• Set an expiration date for the password
• Maintain a history of previously used passwords
• Create a dictionary for screening proposed passwords
The SAM manages these constraints for each user.
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The Falcon LAN does not have any other hardware or
software features beyond the passwords for authentication purposes.
The establishment of a trusted path is critical to authentication
in a networked environment. Although Windows NT was evaluated as
meeting the Class B2 trusted path functional requirements by the
NCSC, the trusted path does not exist external to the individual
workstation. Therefore, assurance from the path between nodes
cannot be provided. Based upon the password policy enforced, the
capabilities provided by Windows NT, and the lack of a trusted path
for the overall network, the estimated authentication ratings for





Fair A trusted path for the overall
network would significantly
strengthen the authentication
services. As for passwords, the
only Guidance recommendation not
met is that passwords are provided
by the system users and not
automated.
Assurance Fair Hardware authentication devices
such as Fortezza cards would
increase the level of assurance
provided
.
Table 7. Authentication Ratings
(2) Communications Field Integrity. Protection
from unauthorized modification of any of the fields involved in a
communication is referred to as communications field integrity.
The header or protocol -information field and the user-data field
are the two fields most commonly referred to with respect to data
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communications. In addition to these two, other fields may be
identified such as control and priority fields.
The mechanism used to ensure communication field
integrity counters active threats and protects the data from
unauthorized modification. Functionally, the service should ensure
the accuracy of the data transmitted from its source to its
destination despite possible equipment failure, attempted access by
an unauthorized user, or code and format conversions from
communication protocols. An automated capability to test for,
detect, and report errors should be included as part of the
network. In addition, effective countermeasures to address
possible attacks to the communications (e.g., jamming, line or node
outages, active wiretapping) should be included. These
countermeasures may be in the form of security policy and
procedures, physical controls, mechanisms, or protocols.
The functionality of the field integrity service is
determined through an evaluation of its ability to detect integrity
violations. The functionality rating ranges from none to good.
Table 8 details the specific requirements for each rating level
.
For ratings of minimum and fair, either requirement must be
provided. Each rating builds on the previous rating and for
ratings of fair and good, the requirements of minimum and fair must
also be met, respectively.
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Rating Required Features
Minimum Integrity is provided for a single Protocol -Data-
Unit (PDU) (e.g., packet, datagram) through the
ability to determine if a received PDU has been
modified.
It can be determined if selected fields within a
PDU have been modified.
Fair It can be determined if selected fields transferred
over a connection have been modified, inserted,
deleted, or replayed.
Any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of
a PDU within a PDU sequence can be detected with no
recovery attempted.
Good Any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of
a PDU within a PDU sequence can be detected with
recovery attempted.
Table 8 . Basis for Communications Field Integrity
Functionality Rating [Ref . 15: p. 181]
The strength of the mechanism is determined through
the policy, procedures, automated or physical controls, mechanisms,
and protocols which ensure the data has not been subjected to
excessive random errors and unauthorized modification. Any
countermeasures to prevent message stream modifications should be
identified and proven to be effective. In addition, the
probability of an undetected error should also be identified. An
automated capability for testing, detecting, reporting, and/or
recovering from communication errors or corruption should be
incorporated into the network. The evaluation range used for the
strength of the mechanism is from none to good.
The Falcon LAN is an Ethernet 10Base2 network.
Therefore, the hardware has the collision detection features of
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Ethernet (i.e., if a collision is detected during transmission, a
special jam signal is transmitted and the message or packet is
resent)
. Physical controls have also been implemented for the
servers and fiber transceivers so only authorized personnel are
granted access to the equipment. In addition, use of the TCP/IP
protocol provides added checks to the transmission of packets.
Beyond these controls, no other security features are currently in
place which would relate directly to the communications field
integrity service. Although the equipment does test and correct
transmission collisions, it does not provide the capabilities
described for a minimum functionality rating in Table 9
.
Therefore, the rating for the communications field integrity would
have to be none
.
(3) Non-Repudiation. The non- repudiation service
"provides unforgeable proof of shipment and/or receipt of data."
[Ref. 15: p. 182] This is accomplished by one or both of the
following means:
• Providing the recipient of the data with a proof of its
origin which will prohibit the sender from denying its
transmission or contents.
• Providing the sender with proof a delivery so the recipient
cannot deny receiving the transmission or its contents.
Digital signature techniques are the most widely
used form of non- repudiation service provided. The technique used
may be based on either the signature of the parties or an
arbitrated scheme in which a third party validates the signature in
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the same manner as a notary public certifies the signatures on
paper documents. The functionality of such a scheme is rated as
either none or present, signifying the absence or presence of the
service on the network.
The strength of the non- repudiation service is
determined by the trust given to the underlying cryptography used
with the digital signature, the correctness of the protocol logic,
and the appropriateness of the implementation. The evaluation
range used for describing the mechanism' s strength is from none to
good. The Falcon LAN does not currently provide any mechanism for
this service. Therefore, the functionality rating would be none.
b. Denial of Service
Service is denied whenever the throughput on the network
falls below a pre-established threshold, access to a remote
component is not available, or resources are not available to end
users. If a connection is active, the denial of service condition
may be detected by monitoring the maximum waiting time or examining
the level of throughput on the system. In contrast, when a
connection is not currently engaged, there is no way of determining
a denial of service attack which cuts off the flow of information
unless the network component knows explicitly when data are to be
transferred to it. The effects of the denial of service condition
should be considered for all network components when determining
network service requirements.
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(1) Continuity of Operations. Security features
aimed at protecting the network against denial of service attacks
from external sources may include built-in redundancy throughout
the network, distribution of network control functions, fault
tolerance mechanisms to prevent hardware failures, and security
controls to monitor access and prevent wiretapping. The
functionality of the continuity service is evaluated with ratings
ranging from none to good. Table 9 identifies the basic
requirements for the various ratings.
The strength of the mechanism is also rated from
none to good, and is evaluated according to the robustness of the
feature and its operational maintenance. Attributes such as
error/fault detection, fault treatment, damage assessment,
error/failure recovery, component /segment crash recovery, and




Minimum The service should detect and report conditions
which result in a degradation of service below a
specified minimum.
Fair The service provided for the minimum rating would
continue in the event of equipment failure or
actions by unauthorized users or processes. This
service may be provided from system redundancy, an
alternate facility, or some other means.
Good This is the same requirement as the minimum rating,
but with automatic adaptation.
Table 9. Functionality Ratings for Continuity of Operations
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Continuity of operations features are incorporated
on the Falcon LAN through hardware, software, and physical
controls. As previously described, the Ethernet backbone has
collision detection and recovery features built-in which monitor
the transmission of packets. A tape backup system is used to
backup crucial data in case a network crash should occur. A full
system backup is performed on a weekly basis and incremental
backups (which include the registry files) are performed daily.
All backup tapes are kept in a vault in a different building than
the servers. In addition, an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS)
provides added assurance in the event of a loss of power.
With Windows NT, the Redundant Array of Inexpensive
Drives (RAID) technology has been used to establish a mirror of the
server files. RAID is a method of protecting "data by combining
smaller, less expensive drives together in a way that data
redundancy and security is increased." [Ref . 27: p. 125] The
Falcon LAN uses RAID level five which uses parity bits to
reconstruct damaged data. A total of 6 GBytes of data are mirrored
between two of the servers
.
Finally, physical controls imposed on the location
of the servers protect them from physical access by unauthorized
individuals, and cabling is visually inspected for wiretapping. In
addition, LED indication lights on the hub may be used for
monitoring access to the LAN.
The majority of these features are aimed at
protecting physical assets and restoring information in the event
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of a system failure. However, the Falcon LAN is missing mechanisms
which would help detect and report conditions resulting in a
degradation of service. For example, if someone were to flood the
network with packets, there is no mechanism in place to detect the
attack. Or, if a node on the network were to experience a
degradation in service, there is no mechanism to detect the
reduction. Mechanisms such as protocols which ping network nodes
for availability would further strengthen the assurance for
continuity of operations on the Falcon LAN. Balancing the lack of
detection and reporting services with the fault tolerance features
provided, the ratings for continuity of operations are estimated to
be minimum for all three features: functionality, strength of
mechanism, and assurance.
(2) Protocol Based Protection. Denial of service
mechanisms are often protocol based and can involve testing or
probing the network. In an attempt not to increase network
overhead, existing communications availability services should be
used whenever feasible. Typically, the rating used for the
functionality of this service is based upon the number of protocol
based mechanisms provided. Specifically, one mechanism would
equate to a rating of minimum, two or three mechanisms are
considered fair, and three or more would be rated as good.
The strength of the mechanism is normally determined
through off-line testing and/or simulation. "Network protocol
robustness may decrease inversely with network loading" and the
testing should address this possibility. [Ref. 15: p. 187] In
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addition, the evaluation should test for both internal failures and
external attacks. Upon completion of all testing, the mechanism is
assigned a rating between none and good for strength.
Windows NT supports numerous transmission protocols.
As a default, NT uses the Network Basic Input/Output System
(NetBIOS) Extended User Interface (NetBEUI) as the actual transport
protocol. [Ref . 27: p. 39] NetBEUI operates at the session layer
of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference model and is
responsible for synchronizing and sequencing the packets in a
network connection, ensuring the connection is maintained until
transmission is completed, and ensuring appropriate security
measures are taken during the session. [Ref. 28: p. 730]
Windows NT also supports the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) , the Data Link Control (DLC)
protocol, and the Internetwork Packet Exchange/Sequenced Packet
Exchange (IPX/SPX) protocol. DLC is typically used with token ring
networks to handle communications between microcomputers and
mainframes. The IPX/SPX protocol is the main protocol used by
Novell and provides communication between Netware products and
Windows NT. Finally, TCP/IP is the main protocol used by NT to
support internetworking. [Ref. 27: pp. 39-40] The TCP/IP
protocol suite is a "connection- and stream-oriented, transport
layer protocol" which uses the IP portion at the network layer to
actually deliver the packets. [Ref. 28: p. 809]
The Falcon LAN uses both the NetBEUI and TCP/IP
protocols for transmission with Windows NT. However, no testing or
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simulation has been conducted with these protocols to fully
determine the level of protection provided within the Falcon LAN.
Therefore, ratings for protocol based protection must be based upon
the wide- spread use and testing of these protocols. Overall, the
rating is estimated to be fair for all three: functionality,
strength of the service, and assurance.
(3) Network Management. Network management focuses
on the overall health of the network, detecting failures and
reduction in levels of service. Any network management protocols
or tools should detect problems in these areas and report them to
the system administrator. The functionality of such tools are
rated as either none or present.
"Integrity and adequacy of control in a network are
the keys in coping with denial of service conditions." [Ref. 15:
p. 188] Fault tolerance mechanisms must be in place to deal with
both internal failures and external attacks . The strength of the
mechanisms provided are evaluated and assigned a rating in the
range of none to good.
The Falcon LAN does have several fault tolerance
mechanisms in place to guard against internal failures. (These
were described previously under the continuity of operations
section.) These features which are in place would also be useful
in the event of a line being cut or a segment of the LAN being
taken out of service. Other than the fault tolerant features and
a staff devoted to monitoring the daily operation of the LAN, there
are no other tools or features implemented. In addition, as
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previously noted, the LAN is lacking mechanisms which would detect
and report system failures. Overall, the functionality rating for
the LAN would be present and the strength of mechanism and
assurance ratings for the overall services provided are estimated
to be fair. If other tools such as a firewall and a
detection/reporting mechanism were added, the strength and
assurance ratings could be higher.
c. Compromise Protection
Compromise protection refers to security services which are
concerned with the secrecy and non-disclosure of information
between components on the network. These features may be provided
through administrative, technical, or physical means.
(1) Data Confidentiality. Data confidentiality
guards against the unauthorized disclosure of information, normally
through passive wiretapping or an unauthorized release of a
message. Physical protection and encryption are the most common
forms of protection used in networks. The functionality of this
service is rated as none or present to indicate the absence or
existence of the service within the network.
Through physical protection and encryption, the
release of a message and traffic analysis can be prevented. For
encryption mechanisms, the NSA normally evaluates the strength of
the mechanism for a given environment and provides the sensitivity
level of the data the mechanism is approved to protect. In turn,




The Falcon LAN does not currently use any encryption
packages to protect data that is transmitted. Although physical
security measures have been taken to secure the servers and
transceivers, each workstation on the network provides a point of
access. The LAN does use the Windows NT time-out feature, which
requires a password be provided for access if the computer has been
sitting idle for a period of time. This reduces the probability
that one can gain access to a computer left idle, but does not
eliminate the threat. Since the network administrator and his
staff cannot possibly be everywhere continuously to ensure
personnel are logging off when done with their system and
unauthorized users are not attempting to use workstations, the data
confidentiality service must be rated as none.
(2) Traffic Flow Confidentiality. This aspect of
confidentiality guards against the unauthorized disclosure of
information through traffic analysis. "Traffic flow
confidentiality is concerned with masking the frequency, length,
and origin-destination patterns of communications between protocol
entities." [Ref . 15: p. 190] Physical protection, encryption,
and traffic padding are the primary mechanisms used to guard
against the traffic analysis threat. The functionality of the
service is normally rated as none or present, and the strength of
the mechanism is evaluated in the same manner as the strength of
the data confidentiality mechanism.
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Again, the Falcon LAN does not have any mechanisms
or features which would provide this service. Therefore, the
rating for traffic flow confidentiality is also none.
(3) Selective Routing. The routes over which data
travel in a network can be selected through dynamic routing or
prearranged paths. In some cases, certain paths or nodes may need
to be avoided when persistent attacks occur along that segment. In
addition, data carrying certain labels may need to be prohibited
from traveling over certain segments of the network. The selective
routing feature enables these changes to be made in the routing of
data across the network. Typically, the functionality of such a
service is rated as none or present and the strength of the
mechanism is given a rating between none and good. The Falcon LAN
does not have this capability installed so the rating for the
selective routing service would be none.
d. Summary of Falcon LAN Services
Table 10 provides a rating summary of the services
provided by the Falcon LAN. Various ratings may change as security
features are added to the network. For example, if encryption
software was implemented for all users, the ratings for non-
repudiation, traffic flow confidentiality, and compromise
protection could change. Since the network has not fully achieved
the desired level of functionality, each of these services should
be re-evaluated once all changes have been implemented.
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Selective Routing Functionality None
Table 10. Evaluation of Network Security Services for Falcon LAN
F. MEETING INTEROPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Ralph H. Sprague, Jr. and Barbara McNurlin define
interoperability in their book Information Systems Management in
Practice as "the capability for different machines, using different
operating systems, on different networks to work together on tasks
- exchanging information in standard ways without any changes in
the command language or in functionality and without physical
intervention." [Ref . 29: p. 186] Overall, achieving
interoperability can be a quite cumbersome task and typically must
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address both internal and external issues. Numerous aspects of the
systems must be addressed, including policies, hardware, software,
and protocols. Although many national and international committees
have made progress over the years in developing standards aimed
precisely at the interoperability issue, the end of the road has
not yet been reached. In an era of piecemeal systems, a great deal
of intervention is required to achieve total connectivity.
In meeting the interoperability requirements of the Falcon
LAN, many issues needed to be addressed. As is typical with any
LAN installation, the various functional requirements have been
prioritized and are being implemented in their respective order of
importance to the command. To date, not all requirements have been
met. The following sections identify the interoperability issues
that have been encountered thus far, and the status of each
functional requirement.
1. Provide a Communications System
The primary goal of the LAN was to provide a backbone
communication system for the various NSGD offices located in two
different buildings. This was accomplished with the backbone
installation conducted by NISE West and the subsequent computer
installations conducted by the NSGD staff.
Since the software applications were all either Windows based
(i.e., Microsoft) or Windows compatible, software interoperability
within the LAN was not a major issue. There were, however, several
problems due to the hardware configurations during the initial
installation. For example, a CD-ROM drive was required for the
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installation of Windows NT on the server. However, the CD-ROM
drive purchased had an Integrated Drive Electronics (IDE) interface
and NT requires a Small Computer Systems Interface-II (SCSI-II)
.
Once a different CD-ROM drive was purchased and installed, it was
not recognized by the hardware because of a SCSI adapter. The
motherboard appeared to be confused between that and the SCSI
adapter on the hard drive. The problem was solved once the adapter
was removed from the CD-ROM drive. Additional problems arose from
the amount of time (approximately one year) the hardware sat in
storage prior to installation. For example, at least three of the
ten mice did not work with the first set of computers installed.
Eventually, the hardware problems were worked out and the staff had
it' s LAN.
2 . Provide a Student Tracking System
The development of a unified database for tracking student
information was also desired. The database software selected for
this task was Microsoft's Access and SQL server. Since SQL is part
of the Microsoft Back Office suite, interoperability between the
database software and the network operating system was not an
issue. The actual development of the database is currently in
progress
.
3 . Provide for Service Management
Access was needed to the DLI Student Database, NITRAS, and the
Army ATRRS programs to allow service needs and student eligibility
requirements to be met. To date, access to the DLI database has
not been achieved due to priorities assigned to the functional
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requirements. Access to both NITRAS and ATRRS is being handled
through dial-up access with a modem.
4 . Provide for Supply and Fiscal Tracking
Access was also required to the Naval Postgraduate School
supply system, the new supply and purchasing system, and on-line
catalogs and supply status servers. This requirement is lower on
the list of priorities than the DLI database. Therefore, it has
not been accomplished to date.
5. Provide Career Counseling Assistance
This requirement was to provide for the maintenance and access
to the student database with career counseling information such as
ASVAB scores, next duty assignment, and prospective gains and
losses. In addition, the Educational Services Officer requires
access to course completion, PARS and other advancement
information, and the staff required access to BUPER's bulletin
boards and detailer E-mail.
The NSGD student database is currently being converted to
Microsoft Access. Once the conversion is completed, it will then
be formatted for the SQL server. Microsoft Access is a relational
database management system which permits data to be viewed in
various ways. The "Database Wizard" enables users to build tables,
queries, forms, and reports from the data and the "Table Analyzer
Wizard" enables data from flat-files and spreadsheets to be
converted into a relational database. [Ref. 30] The SQL server
provides the database management system functions needed for the
distributed client-server environment.
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The detailer electronic mail requirement has been achieved and
is working smoothly. Access to BUPERS bulletin board is provided
through two means: dial-up modem connectivity and the BUPERS World
Wide Web (WWW) home page.
6 . Provide for Command Information Dissemination
Dissemination and tracking of command welcome aboard packages,
and access to NSGD home page from the World Wide Web (WWW) was
required. These requirements have all been accomplished with WWW
access provided through the DLI CISCO router. The NSGD home page
can be found at http://www.nsgdmry.navy.mil.
7 . Allow for the Sharing of Electronic mail with DLI
Access to and compatibility with the DLI Microsoft Mail server
was needed to allow the transfer of electronic mail between the
NSGD and DLI staffs. This included the requirement to establish
electronic mail accounts for the NSGD staff and students.
Electronic mail within the NSGD staff has been accomplished,
however, connectivity with the DLI staff has not. Problems have
been encountered due to the differences between the Microsoft Mail
Server and Microsoft Exchange Server configurations. DLI will be
changing from the Mail Server to an Exchange Server in the near
future which should permit the connectivity to proceed. The
fulfillment of this requirement remains in progress.
8. Provide for the Instruction of the Cryptologic
Technician Apprentice Common Core Curriculum
Connections between the Falcon LAN and the new educational LAN
in the Learning Center is desired. To date, this requirement has
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not been fulfilled due to priorities and the need for hardware
upgrades to complete the task. The hardware required for
connecting the LANs has been received, just not installed.
9 . Provide for the Dissemination of Message Traffic on the
LAN
The ability to receive unclassified message traffic using the
Defense Message System (DMS) was an additional requirement for the
Falcon LAN. This is currently being handled through a stand-alone
computer and was the focus of another thesis.
123
124
VI. CONCLUSION - THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF ENSURING TRUST
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood
of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to
receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but
rather on the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.
- The Art of War










Not Met Secure network interface needed;
remote access may be a problem
Audit Not Met Boot floppy vulnerability; Fortezza






















Met The Network System Architecture and
Design need a thorough evaluation.
However, this is listed as met
because Windows NT is so thoroughly
documented
.
Table 11. Analysis of Falcon LAN Class C2 Requirements
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With the current configuration of the Falcon LAN, the system
should not be accredited as providing a Class C2 level of trust.
It does come close in many regards, although several requirements
are met only in Windows NT in stand-alone mode. The issue of
authentication is the major concern which needs to be addressed.
Table 11 provides a breakdown of the TCSEC/TNI requirements for
Class C2 and identifies the specific points of concern with respect
to the Falcon LAN.
B . RECOMMENDATIONS
After thoroughly evaluating the TCSEC and TNI criterion, there
are two major recommendations for the Falcon LAN. First, the
addition of secure network interface cards or Fortezza cards to the
various components of the network may help to eliminate the
authentication problems identified. NSA has expressed concern
about the authentication problems of Windows NT and has agreed to
pay for the development of a special version of the software which
meets B-level requirements. Government Computer News announced in
January that NSA had "awarded a contract to Global Internet of Palo
Alto, California, to conduct a feasibility study on ways to beef up
Windows NT 3.51 security and develop a prototype encryption card
access control system based on Fortezza." [Ref . 31] If this
upgrade does not come in time for meeting the Class C2 requirement,
then depending upon the results of the current testing by the NCSC
on Novell's Netware version 4.1, the command may want to
investigate replacing the network operating system itself (Windows
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NT Server) with Netware. Windows NT Workstation could still be
maintained on the various components. However, prior to deciding
on this course of action, research into the compatibility of the
file systems (i.e., NTFS versus FAT tables) should be done to
ensure a smooth transfer of files.
Netware 4.1 is being evaluated by the NCSC according to the
TNI criterion and entered into the final evaluation phase in August
1995. The evaluation is covering "both the Netware 4.1 code and
Cordant Incorporated' s Assure bus-monitor card for ISA-bus systems
and is designed to control user access to networks, peripherals,
and local memory." [Ref . 32] Cordant is also working on a
Fortezza integration with this card. If Netware 4 . 1 is certified,
it will be the first network operating system to be certified for
a network environment according to the TNI criterion.
Second, the incorporation of firewalls is recommended for
helping to ensure the confidentiality of sensitive data. Threats
from connecting to the Internet range from "curious prowlers to
well -organized, technically-knowledgeable intruders that could gain
access to a site's private information or interfere" with the
availability of resources. [Ref. 32] During the past decade,
firewalls have become a popular countermeasure to prevent
unauthorized access from external sources.
A firewall is actually a collection of components used to
protect one network from another untrusted network. Because the
Internet is not secure and provides no performance guarantees,
firewalls are typically thought of for accessing the Internet.
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They can, however, be used between any two networks where one is
not trusted. The purpose of the firewall is to provide controlled
access to both internal and external services. Firewalls are
important because they provide a single "choke point" where
security and auditing features may be provided.
There are two types of firewalls: packet filtering gateways
and application gateways. The packet filtering gateway operates at
the Transport Layer of the TCP/IP architecture and simply blocks or
filters traffic based upon the address and/or protocol. The
application gateway operates at the Application Layer of the TCP/IP
architecture, and provides a more specific level of filtering.
Packet filtering gateways are the easiest to configure and
employ, but they are also the least effective. There is no logging
capability on a packet filtering gateway, so it is difficult to
detect if and when an intruder has corrupted the router. This type
of firewall is also difficult to test for all vulnerabilities,
because the firewall normally permits all traffic to pass unless
specifically denied. If an intruder does break through the
firewall, the host becomes directly accessible from the Internet.
Finally, a firewall which depends solely on address filtering can
be spoofed. "Spoofing is an attack in which a system attempts to
illicitly impersonate another system by using its IP network
address." [Ref . 34]
Application gateways are more secure, because they are
application specific and have auditing capabilities. They are
usually combined with a packet filtering gateway and add another
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security filter at the application level. Consequently, an
intruder's packet may pass through the initial packet filtering
firewall, but it will not have direct access to the host system if
it is also required to go through an application firewall. When the
packet reaches the application gateway, the gateway checks its
access matrices and grants or denies access to the requested
application or service. If access is denied, the packets are
logged and dropped. If access is granted, the packets are
permitted access to the requested application, but nothing else.
The application gateway never allows access to the host system and
serves as a proxy for the requested service. It is very secure
because it allows the network manager to control who has access to
the network and its applications.
There is a false sense by many that a firewall is a security
panacea for Internet security. A firewall, like any security
countermeasure, is not the end all solution, but rather a tool to
help safeguard system resources. The following security guidance
is recommended with the use of firewalls on the Falcon LAN:
• Components which permit public access should be located
outside of any firewalls. This would include dial-in modems
and WWW servers
.
• Install a packet filtering gateway to filter out unwanted
guests based upon their address. Behind this firewall would
reside all student and staff accounts with the data widely
available. The firewall currently resident with the DLI
CISCO router could be used for this requirement, but modem
access behind the router (internal to the NSGD LAN) is
discouraged. Modems provide a point of access to the LAN,
which would circumvent the firewall.
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• An application firewall behind the first firewall should be
installed to separate all sensitive data (e.g., grades,
clearance information, etc.) from the rest.
There is a wide range of firewall products available today
with respect to both quality and strength. Routers with built-in
packet filtering gateways start at approximately $3,000. Most
commercial firewall packages range from approximately $10,000 to
over $250,000 in price. "Home-grown" firewalls can be built for
considerably less money, however, building a firewall requires a
significant amount of skill and knowledge of the TCP/IP
architecture. Regardless of the type of firewall selected, it will
require regular maintenance, installation of software patches and
updates, and regular monitoring.
During the fall of 1995, the National Computer Security
Association (NCSA) organized the Firewall Product Developers'
Consortium (FWPD) to bring major vendors of firewall products
together. "The purpose of the consortium was to decrease confusion
about computer firewall products, enhance quality, provide a common
terminology and testing methodology, and improve the ease-of-use
and security of firewall products." [Ref . 35] By February 1996,
the consortium had developed a baseline of functions that firewall
products should offer and procedures to certify products according
to performance criteria. The performance criteria used includes
the "ability to handle 90% of security threats based on the
likelihood of attack by hackers, ease of use by hackers, and how
much harm could be done." [Ref. 36] Application- level firewalls,
in particular, are tested against "approximately 120 types of
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network attacks and must resist the most common and dangerous ones
in order to earn the NCSA certification. The tests emphasize the
success or failure of the firewall against intrusion attempts, not
the methods by which such attempts are blocked." [Ref . 37] The
testing process does not stop once a product is certified, rather
products are retested at least once per quarter to address changing
business needs and new security threats. The intent of the
certification program is to provide users with a level of assurance
that the firewall will provide the desired protection against
existing and future threats. Participating vendors and products
that have been certified can be found through the NCSA home page at
http://www.ncsa.com. The page currently has 16 certified products
listed including Borderware, Checkpoint Firewall-1, AltaVista,
IBM's Secured Network Gateway, Eagle, Sunscreen SPF-100, and
Gauntlet Internet Firewall System. [Ref. 38]
C. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TCSEC
Requiring specific levels of trust for the military computer
systems has both its advantages and disadvantages. The major
advantage is that criteria provide a common basis for discourse.
If a specific level of trust (e.g., Class C2) is specified, then
users are guaranteed a system with at least the features and
assurances prescribed by the TCSEC. Without some well-defined




Other major advantages include an increased level of awareness
given to computer security, an overall higher level of assurance
against major threats to most systems, and a range of more secure
products available to DOD activities. As the National Research
Council noted in 1991:
If one waits until a threat manifests through a
successful attack, then significant damage can be done
before an effective countermeasure can be developed and
deployed. Therefore, countermeasure engineering must be
based on speculation. Effort may be expended in
countering attacks that are never attempted. The need to
speculate and to budget resources for countermeasures
also implies a need to understand what it is that should
be protected and why. [Ref. 2: p. 157]
By requiring military organizations to ensure a specified level of
trust for their operational environment, the safeguards will
hopefully be in place when an attack is attempted. The control of
information could be compared to the need for sea control.
Numerous resources are devoted to ensuring the proper controls are
in place at sea. If the same controls were not in place, the
resultant costs would be too great once an attack had occurred.
Yet when it comes to controlling our information, too many systems
have been implemented with little or no regard for security until
a compromise has occurred. By forcing users to evaluate security
threats and countermeasures, the overall security of the system
will increase.
On the other hand, requiring a specific level of trust is not
free. The added life-cycle costs to maintain the system and
monitor the security features are increased as the level of trust
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increases. Personnel must be available, trained, and dedicated to
their jobs to ensure the security features of the hardware and
software are not bypassed. Audit logs in particular, require
numerous manhours to review. In addition, the purchase price of
"trusted systems" will tend to be higher.
Another disadvantage to requiring trusted systems is the lack
of availability of trusted hardware and software. To have a system
evaluated by the NCSC for a certain level of trust is expensive
both in terms of time and financial support. Most evaluations
require years to complete, and many vendors are reluctant to
initiate an evaluation due to these costs. In addition, there is
an overall lack of products certified to operate in a networked
environment, which describes the majority of systems used by the
military today. Until the benefits from having a product certified
outweigh the costs, the availability of certified products will
remain a problem for many organizations.
Finally, the certification and accreditation process can be
quite cumbersome for most commands. The military does not
currently have enough personnel adequately trained to conduct a
thorough system certification and the requirements can be
confusing. Although using a certified product assists with the
overall procedure, it does not replace the requirement to
thoroughly evaluate the system for its operational environment.
Until more certified products are available and personnel receive
the appropriate training, many commands will continue to struggle
with the certification and accreditation process.
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D. SUMMARY
This thesis set out to examine the current applicability of
the Class C2 level of trust in a typical command environment using
Windows NT. In meeting this objective, the certification and
accreditation requirements had to be closely examined as well as
the software and hardware of the environment selected. Although
the commercial-off-the-shelf products are getting much closer to
providing an avenue for achieving the desired level of trust, there
is still much progress to be made. Perhaps in the future, system
administrators will be able to walk into a computer store and
purchase products which are appropriate for the security
requirements of their operational environment. Use of these
products will not eliminate the requirement for certification and
accreditation, but will make the attainment of trusted systems
possible. However, until that day arrives, caution must be given
to the network configurations selected to meet a command's
functional requirements. In the meantime, the widespread
establishment of Class C2 systems throughout the military remains
on the road ahead.
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